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DAMAGES IN SEX HARASSMENT CASES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
AMERICAN, CANADIAN, AND BRITISH LAW
Joseph M. Kelly* & Bob Watt"
I. INTRODUCTION
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States have all experienced an
explosion in sexual harassment litigation. All countries now have
administrative agencies that adjudicate allegations of sexual harassment in
the workplace and which may award damages beyond back or front pay.
While sex discrimination has long been prohibited in most countries,
providing a legal remedy for sexual harassment is a relatively recent
development.' In this article, the authors survey sexual harassment
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the International Bar Association section on Sports and Gaming Law. Since 1995, he has
been Chair of the International Bar Association section on Sports and Gaming Law. He
has published numerous law review articles on transnational legal topics. He has been a
featured speaker at International Bar Association conferences in Buenos Aires, Cannes,
Montreal, New York, and Edinburgh. He also was a speaker in New Delhi (Indian Law
Institute) and in Jerusalem. He received his J.D., cum laude, from Northern Illinois
University College of Law (1979) and his Ph.D. from Loyola University of Chicago
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1. Author Bob Watt has argued elsewhere that sexual harassment should not be viewed
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litigation in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, paying particular
attention to the levels of compensation or damages that have been awarded
to successful litigants in each country. A number of conclusions are then
drawn from this survey.
While most sexual harassment is by men against women, not all
sexual harassment cases involve complaints by female workers against
their male superiors. In one case, a male manager of a California
manufacturing plant who sued his former female boss and employer for
sexual harassment received a record $1.017 million in damages.2 The jury
of ten women and two men included $375,000 for emotional distress and
$550,000 in punitive damages in its award against the company.' The
male victim in this case delayed reporting the incident for four years and,
ironically, had "a history of sexually harassing his own employees. . . .
The victim's attorney understandably viewed the verdict "as a vindication
of the rights of 'all persons, including men, . . . to a workplace free of
... sexual harassment."'" Some women's rights activists, however,
believe the verdict "reflects deep-rooted prejudice against powerful women
in business positions," 6 and that the jury was biased against the female
supervisor because of her business success. 7 In perhaps the most bizarre
as a form of discrimination. See Janet Dine & Bob Watt, Sexual Harassment: Moving
Away from Discrimination, 58 MOD. L. REv. 343 (1995).
2. Only in America, FORTUNE, June 28, 1993, at 150 (male worker wins $1 million
in sexual harassment case against female spa owner); Elizabeth Kadetsky, The Million
Dollar Man (Sabino Gutierrez Charges Female Boss With Sexual Harassment), WORKING
WOMAN, Oct. 1993, at 46; Man Wins $1 Million Sex Harassment Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 1993 (Late ed.), at A15.
3. Man Wins $1 Million Sex Harassment Suit, supra note 2.
4. Kadetsky, supra note 2.
5. Only in America, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Id. The trial judge offered reduced damages of $350,000 or a new trial for
damages. Gutierrez requested a new trial. Marjorie Murray, Sex Discrimination: Judges
v. Juries, WORKING WOMAN, Mar. 1, 1994, at 11. In another harassment case filed by
a former used car salesman against his manager, the complainant alleged offensive
touching and sexually suggestive remarks which resulted in a hostile work environment
causing extreme "emotional distress." Former Salesman Files Sex Harassment Suit,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 11, 1993, at 23. Plaintiff later discovered the alleged harasser
was a transsexual. Id.; Mark Shaffer, Harassment Suit Filed Against Transsexual Boss,
Asuz. REpuuc, Sept. 9, 1993, at B2.
Some cases settle out of court. An aide to a St. Paul, Minnesota City Councilwoman
received $105,000 in October 1993 for alleged harassment occurring from January 1990
until August 1991 which included an invitation to join her harem. Julia Lawlor, Women
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case yet reported, two male jewelry workers were forced to engage in
sexual acts with their male boss's secretary. Specifically, "[one] was
ordered to have sex with [the secretary] during an after-hours striptease at
work."' The other male employee was forced to have sex with the same
secretary.9 The judge in this case awarded the second plaintiff damages
of $1737 in back pay and the first only $1 for sexual harassment, both
were awarded litigation costs.'o
One recent study found that an average of three percent of New York
males have been harassed by their female bosses, while two percent of
New York males have been harassed by gay male bosses." The same
study indicated that females are two to three times more likely to be
harassed by their male bosses than a male employee is likely to be
harassed by his female supervisor. 2 In fact, one federal judge commented
that "[a]ccording to a May 21, 1993 article in the New York Times, EEOC
[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] records show that in 1992,
Gain Power, Means to Abuse It, U.S.A TODAY, Jan. 17, 1994, at Al. His attorney said
that the typical attitude toward a male victim is, "What a wimp! Lay back and enjoy it."
Id. In another case, a male worker who complained that female coworkers "fondled his
buttocks and wrote him sex notes" was awarded $100 by a jury. Neal Templin, Sex and
Power in the Office: "Unwanted Advances" Affect Men, Too; Ask Gary Showalter, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 18, 1991, at B3.
8. Templin, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. Id. Harassment claims made by men are no longer uncommon. See, e.g.,
Barbara Carton, Muscled Out? At Jenny Craig, Men Are the Ones Who Claim Sex
Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1994, at Al. Eight males, all former Jenny Craig
employees, filed sex harassment complaints with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, alleging comments such as "tight buns" had been made and the necessity
of a sex change or wearing a bra as a requirement for promotion. Id. Three of the men
have been informed that the Commission has determined their complaints have probable
cause for "gender bias." Id. See also David Kipen, Disclosure Discourse Disheartens:
Women Remain Outraged at the Portrayal of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, TAMPA
Tum., Jan. 7, 1995, at 1; John Carlin, "Harassed" American Men Sue the Pants Off One
Another, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 5, 1995, at 18; cf. Smith v. Velcro
Laminates, Inc., 3:94-CV-556RP, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12654 (N.D. Ind.) (summary
judgment granted to the defendant notwithstanding, arguendo, that female supervisor's
actions to a male were unwelcome sexual harassment and the male employee failed to
present evidence to rebut the defendant's claims that the plaintiff was terminated for poor
work performance).
11. Harassment at 25% in N.Y. Poll, GAZETTE (Montreal), Jan. 31, 1994, at C1.
12. Id. During the past 12 years, approximately 10 percent of the 450 to 600
complaints filed annually at the New York Office of Sexual Harassment were filed by
men. Alfred Lubrano, Turning the Tables Men-as-Victim Stories Start to Percolate in the
Workplace, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 10, 1994, at D3.
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968 sexual harassment claims [out of 10,57713] were filed by men,"
4
compared with 514 out of 6886 complaints filed in 1991.'"
Canadian authorities also agree that female harassment of males is
rare.16 One Canadian employment law specialist could not "confirm that
the sexual harassment of men is as common as the media seem to think.
The problem is still far more likely to affect women. However, [female
harassment of males] does happen. , 17 In the United Kingdom, as in the
U.S. and Canada, men have been sexually harassed. In one English case,
a male security guard received $4450 in general compensatory damages
and $2250 in moral damages for "hurt feelings" when he was sexually
harassed by his male boss.1
Same-sex sexual harassment is estimated at approximately five percent
of all harassment cases.' 9 The number may increase as gays become
increasingly vocal about their rights as employees; 20 however, "[w]hether
same-gender sexual harassment is actionable is a vigorously debated
issue." 21 Some jurisdictions in the United States have concluded that an
employee has a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment. In
Mogilefsky v. Superior Court,22 a California appellate court reversed a trial
court's finding that a sexual harassment suit filed against an individual of
13. Man Wins $1 Million Sex Harassment Suit, supra note 2.
14. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Van
Graafeiland, J., concurring) (italics added) (referring to Man Wins $1 Million Sex
Harassment Suit, supra note 2).
15. Man Wins $1 Million Sex Harassment Suit, supra note 2.
16. "Spokespersons for the Ontario and Canadian human rights commissions said they
know of no successful complaints involving female-on-male harassment." Lubrano, supra
note 12.
17. Rosalind Coward, Th7e Female Harasser: She's Sexually Rapacious, Power-Mad
and Largely a Media Creation, GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 7, 1994, at F1.
18. Harassment Case in Britain, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1993, at Al1. In Britain and
in each Canadian province except Quebec, hurt feelings is the equivalent of pain and
suffering in the U.S. In Quebec, moral damages are awarded for hurt feelings.
19. Susan Christian, Battle Against Same Sex Harassment Comes Out of the Closet,
L.A. TIMEs, July 12, 1994, (Life & Style) at El.
20. Id.
21. Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., No. CV-N-94-450-ECR, slip op. at 4 n.4 (D. Nev. June
21, 1995). After allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in a prior proceeding,
Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Nev. Jan. 27, 1995), the court, in an
unpublished opinion, concluded that there was no cause of action for heterosexual males
harassed by drawings of naked men or homoerotic pornography. Fox, No. CV-N-94-450-
ECR, slip op. at 9.
22. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1993).
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the same sex as the plaintiff was "not a sex harassment case ... . "23 The
complainant in Mogilefsky alleged that his supervisor had told him that he
would receive more compensation if he joined him in his hotel suite,24 and
that the supervisor had created a sexually-harassing environment.25 In
rejecting an earlier California appellate decision, 26 the Mogilefsky court
stated,
[wle find no basis of support in the statutory language for the
contention that the Legislature intended to limit protection from
sexual harassment to male-female harassment. Although the
statute does not specify whether it prohibits "same gender"
harassment or "other gender" harassment, no ambiguity is
created by this omission. Common usage indicates that in the
absence of a modifying adjective, the Legislature intended to
prohibit sexual harassment in all cases.27
The Mogilefsky court also criticized Goluszek v. Smith,28 in which an
Illinois court concluded that same-sex sexual harassment was "not the type
of conduct Congress intended to sanction when it enacted Title VII [of the
1964 Civil Rights Act]. ,,29 In contrast, the Mogilefsky court stressed that
"the weight of federal authority" does allow a remedy for same-sex
harassment and cited, inter alia, Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power30 as
one example. In Polly, the court concluded that "Title VII was intended
to apply to claims of harassment based on sex, without regard to the
23. Id. at 117 (quoting the minute order issued by the trial court ill Mogilefsky v.
Silver Pictures, No. SC 016436, min. order (Super. Ct. L.A. Nov. 16, 1992)). The case.
settled out of court for an undisclosed sum. An attorney for the motion picture studio
utilized a unique argument. "As a feminist, I object to men taking advantage of a law
meant to give women equal footing at the workplace." Christian, supra note 19. In
August 1995, a federal jury concluded that a male employee was sexually harassed by his
male supervisor. The case settled for an undisclosed sum before the jury could determine
damages. Man Wins Harassment Suit Against Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at 15.
24. Mogilefsky, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 119 (rejecting the precedential value of Hart v. National Mortgage & Land
Co. 235 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987)).
27. Mogilefsky, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
28. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
29. Mogilefsky, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120 (quoting Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456).
30. 825 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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gender of the complainant or the harassing party." 3  The court went on
to quote from the EEOC's Compliance Manual: "The victim does not have
to be of the opposite sex from the harasser.
32
If same-sex sexual harassment is actionable, the logical extension
would, of course, be to allow a cause of action against a gay or lesbian
harasser if his or her ictions were responsible for the creation of a hostile
work environment. In Smith v. Brimfield Precision, Inc.,13 the plaintiff
quit his job after several weeks because a male coworker had grabbed the
plaintiff's nipple, pulled the hair on his arm, and suggested oral sex.
34
When the plaintiff complained, the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination awarded him $25,000 for emotional distress
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was unemployed for only two
weeks. 35 In another case, a heterosexual forty-six year-old female stage
director at the New York Metropolitan Opera accused her employer and
two gay employees of creating a hostile work environment and alleged she
had been fired because she had "complained about 'numerous objectional
pictures of young males in various stages of nudity' plastered up on the
opera house walls in areas where she worked."36
What if the victim is being harassed by a bisexual? In some
instances, a supervisor may be liable if his or her verbal harassment is
directed at both male and female employees. The analysis may hinge upon
whether the person is a bisexual harasser or an equal opportunity harasser.
In Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp. , a supervisor was alleged to have
subjected a husband and wife to "an incessant series of sexually abusive
remarks... "38 The court, in denying the defendant's motion for
31. Id. at 137.
32. Id. (quoting the EEOC Man. ICC1i) § 615.212)bI13)). Although the plaintiffs
sexual harassment claim failed in Polly, the court concluded that Title VII was applicable
to same-sex sexual harassment. Id.
33. No. 90-SEM-0150 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Feb. 7, 1995).
34. Carlin, supra note 10.
35. Id. Smith v. Brimfield "has no precedent either in [Massachusetts], in the rest of
the United States or, in all likelihood, anywhere on the planet." Id.
36. Sue Reid, All Het Up at the Met, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London), June 4, 1995, at
13.
37. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993).
38. Id. at 1335. See Kotyc v. Canadian Empl. & Immigration Comm'n, 5 Can. Hum.
Rts. Rep. D/1995 (Feb.-Maw. 1994). "The centval pvahtexm in atl of them situatiaus is
that a specific employee (whether male or female [or] heterosexual or homosexual) is the
subject of harassment and therefore has had imposed on him or her, conditions of
employment which were not inflicted upon employees of the opposite gender. The target
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summary judgment, concluded that the supervisor was not really "a
bisexual harasser, but [rather] an 'equal-opportunity' harasser whose
remarks were gender-driven." 39 The law on bisexual sexual harassment
is, however, still uncertain.' In Ryczek v. Guest Services Inc., ' the
of the harassment suffers disparate treatment based on sex. As was noted in Bundy v.
Jackson:" Id. 16284.
[In each instance the question is one of but-for causation: would the
complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a
different gender? Only by a reductio ad absurdum could we imagine a case
of harassment that is not sex discrimination where a bisexual supervisor
harasses men and women alike.
Id. (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)).
As the court in Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1995), explained, abusive comments that relate
to gender constitute harassment. "It is one thing to call a woman 'worthless,' and another
to call her a 'worthless broad."' Id. at 1464. "[Race-based and gender-based] language
differs fundamentally [from] terms like 'jerk' or 'asshole."' Id. Cf. Johnson v. Tower
Air, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (no cause of action notwithstanding male
supervisor's obscene gestures such as grabbing his crotch since he was unpleasant to both
sexes and his actions appeared "far more hostile and angry than they [did] sexual." Id.
at 4 6 9 .)
39. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337.
40. The following recent cases have found liability or indicated in dicta they would find
Title VII liability for same-sex sexual harassment:
Male/Male EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, (M.D. Tenn.
1995); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. CIV.A.2:93-2372-18AJ., 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18211 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896
F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825
F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Tex. 1993);
Female/Female Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60
(D.P.R. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., Inc., 878 F. Supp.
229 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (Title VII covers homosexual female-to-female sexual
harassment).
The following recent cases have found NO liability under Title VII for same-sex sexual
harassment:
Male/Male Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa 1995)
(granting summary judgment notwithstanding plaintiff having his testicles
grabbed about 100 times by at least 12 employees because the harassment was
not done because of plaintiffs gender); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28
F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C.
.1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind.
1994); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md.
1994);
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plaintiff worked as a student employee for a culinary arts employer.42 The
plaintiff alleged that she had been subjected to unwelcome sexual
comments from her female supervisor, including an inquiry about her
breast size.4 3 The court, while granting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, opined that if the pattern of harassment had been
sufficiently pervasive, the plaintiff might have had a viable cause of action
if her supervisor was a lesbian, but not if her supervisor was bisexual."
The Ryczek court further suggested that "any defendant could avoid Title
VII liability for sexual harassment by claiming to be a bisexual or by
harassing members of both sexes. This would appear to produce an
anomalous result: a victim of sexual harassment. .. would have a Title
VII remedy in all situations except those in which the victim is harassed
by a particularly unspeakable cad who harasses both men and women."'45
The court noted that, at the very least, this "would lead to bizarre results
and some rather provocative trial testimony." 46
II. THE UNITED STATES
During the early 1980s, numerous federal appellate decisions
concluded that a sexually hostile work environment was actionable.47
These decisions were reached under the parameters of sexual harassment
litigation established in two United States Supreme Court cases: Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson48 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 49  In
Meritor, the Supreme Court explained that sexual harassment generally has
Female/Female Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex.
1995).
41. 877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995).
42. Id. at 756.
43. Id. at 759 n.4.
44. Id. at 761.
45. Id. at 762.
46. Id. at 761 n.6.
47. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Anne M. O'Leary-Kelly, Continuing Violations and
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: When Is Enough, Enough? 31 AM. Bus. L.J.,
365, 367 (1993).
48. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Justice Marshall expressed his desire to hold employers
strictly liable for sex harassment. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). By September 1994, the plaintiff was "one step closer"
to receiving damages of $151,435 in back pay and interest as recommended by a federal
magistrate. Harris, One Step Closer to Collecting Damages for Sexual Harassment,
WASH. INSIDER (BNA), Sept. 23, 1994.
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two recognized forms. The first is "quid pro quo" harassment, where an
employee's continued employment or benefits are contingent upon his or
her acceptance of an unwelcome sexual advance.50 The employer is
always strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment.5' The second form of
harassment is the creation of a hostile or abusive workplace environment,
where an employee is subjected to offensive sexual activity or innuendos
at the workplace.52 In cases of hostile workplace environment harassment,
an employer may be held liable if it should have known about the
workplace harassment.53 In either form, however, "[t]he gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome."' 54 While the Supreme Court has not yet decided what
standard should be applied by the courts in determining what constitutes
unwelcome or offensive sexual behavior,55 many federal appellate courts
have applied the standard of a "reasonable woman" under similar
circumstances .56
50. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
51. David L. Gregory, Sex Discrimination: Continuing Clarifications by the Second
Circuit, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 363, 389 (1995).
52. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 68. "Welcome sexual harassment" is an oxymoron. Cf. Reed v. Shepard,
939 F.2d 484, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1991).
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
56. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993), reh'g and
reh 'g en banc denied, No. 92-2059NICR, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10003 (8th Cir. 1993);
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895
F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir.
1987); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
130 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1995).
As the Andrews court explained in adopting the reasonable woman standard for
workplace liability, "Obscene language and pornography quite possibly could be regarded
as 'highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal with her fellow employees and clients
with professional dignity and without the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse.'
Although men may find these actions harmless and innocent, it is highly possible that
women may feel otherwise." Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485-86 (citations omitted). State
supreme courts, however, are split on this issue. See Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626
A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993), which accepted a gender-conscious standard, id. at 453-54, and
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993), which rejected a gender-conscious
standard for various reasons including the observation that "a gender-conscious standard
could reintrench the very sexist attitudes it is attempting to counter. The belief that
women are entitled to a separate legal standard merely reinforces, and perhaps originates
from, the stereotypic notion that first justified subordinating women in the workplace."
id. at 167.
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In Harris, the Supreme Court eased the plaintiff's burden of proof by
concluding that a sexual harassment victim is not required to prove
psychological damage. 57  The Court stated that "[s]o long as the
environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.""
Federal appellate courts began to ease the complainant's burden of proof
almost immediately after this standard was established. For example, in
Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc.," a female employee
alleged she was sexually harassed at work but the trial court denied
judicial relief because she had posed nude "in a lewd magazine called
Easyriders."6 The trial court found for the defendant;6 however, its
decision was reversed by the appellate court which stated that the trial
court's finding "that the conduct was unwelcome but not offensive was
internally inconsistent as a matter of law. Whether the behavior is
unwelcomed is to be determined by weighing whether the conduct was
uninvited and offensive. "62
Sexual harassment litigation has been stimulated in the United States
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which for the first time made the same
remedies available to victims of discrimination based on age, race, sex, or
disability.63 This Act permits a jury to award exemplary and other
damages on a sliding scale ranging from $50,000 (where the employer
employs fifteen to 100 individuals) to a cap of $300,000 (where more than
500 individuals are employed), 64 excluding racial discrimination, where
there is no cap.65 Prior to the passage of this Act, an individual who
wished to take legal action against an employer that permitted or engaged
in any form of prohibited discrimination had to file a complaint with the
A Canadian author has argued for the adoption of a "Reasonable Victim" standard
instead of either a reasonable person or a reasonable man standard. See Kathleen
Gallivan, Sexual Harassment After Janzen v. Platy: The Transformative Possibilities, 49
U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 27, 56-57 (1991).
57. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.
58. Id. at 371 (citation oniitted).
59. 989 F.2d 959.
60. See id. at 962.
61. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
62. Bums, 989 F.2d at 962.
63. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 .).S.C. § 200O0e-2 (1995)).
64. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(3) (1995)).
65. See 42 U.S.C. 1981A(b)(4) (1995).
[Vol. 16
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This condition
precedent to litigation was often seen as a waste of time since the EEOC
rarely took any action.66 Often a complainant would timely file the
complaint, wait the required 180 days, and then receive a "right to sue"
letter which allowed him or her to litigate in federal court within ninety
days of receipt of the letter.67 Furthermore, the only remedy then
available under Title VII was back pay and reinstatement.68 Consequently,
the plaintiffs lawyer would often file common law tort claims such as the
intentional infliction of emotional distress or battery.
Now, as a result of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff not only
may seek up to $300,000 in damages for sexual harassment,69 but may
also file pendant common law causes of action for intentional torts or,
simultaneously, a cause of action pursuant to a state human rights act.70
66. K. Bruce Stickler, For Job-Bias Suits, Ballooning Costs, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
1994, at 11. In 1991, 6883 sex harassment complaints were filed with the EEOC. In
1992, 10,501 sex harassment complaints were filed, and in fiscal 1993, 11,983 sex
harassment complaints were filed. The awards from 1992 to 1993 increased by 98%. Id.
For information on the EEOC and the resolution of complaints, see Cost of Sexual
Harassment to Employers Up Sharply, WOMEN IN PUB. SERV. (SUNY/Ctr. for Women
in Gov't, Albany, N.Y.), Spring 1994. The EEOC has rejected 73% (34,471) of filed sex
harassment cases (54,908) for insufficient cause over the six years prior to 1995.
"Another 7,899 have been left adrift ... [and 991 have been pushed] to the threshold of
a lawsuit." Peter T. Kilborn, A Sexual Harassment Case Draws Swift Action from an
Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995, at A16. When a union steward exposed himself to
two female workers, they filed complaints but were subjected to retaliatory abuse and
eventually quit. The supervisor was convicted of public indecency and the EEOC
"finished most of its [investigatory] work in nine months-'lightning speed,"' id.,
according to the plaintiff's lawyer. The EEOC conciliation process resulted in suggested
"payments to the women totaling at least several hundred thousand dollars each." Id.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)-(f) (1995). Sometimes there are extreme delays in the
EEOC investigative process. In United States EEOC v. Acorn Niles Corp., No. 93 C
5981, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9346 (N.D. 11. Jul. 6, 1995), the defendant unsuccessfully
argued laches when the EEOC received a sexual harassment complaint in May 1989 and
filed suit in September 1993.
68. Stickler, supra note 66.
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(3) (1995).
70. See generally Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage
for Wrongful Employment Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus.
LAW. 689 (1994). See also Taylor v. Central Pa. Drug and Alcohol Servs. Corp., 890
F. Supp. 360, 373 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (plaintiff withdrew her demand for punitive damages
at trial). New York's Human Rights Law has been interpreted as not permitting punitive
damages, but the law does permit a complainant to receive over $300,000 for hurt
feelings. Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 606 N.E.2d 1369, 1370, 1371 (1992).
California statutes have no limit on sexual harassment awards. The Pennsylvania Human
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Damages pursuant to the 1991 Act may not be assessed against the
harassing supervisor.7 Because Congress decided not to include small
entities under the Act, many federal courts have concluded that "it is
inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against
individual employees.'
A plaintiff may, of course, bring both racial and sexual harassment
claims in a single action. In Johnson v. Indopco, Inc.,7 an African-
American employee claimed in her amended complaint that she was
racially discriminated against and sexually harassed when her personnel
manager, commenting on her marriage at a young age, stated that she
should not "settle for second best when [she] could have the best with
[him]." 74 The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the racial
discrimination claim, but allowed his motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
sexual harassment claim because it found the pleaded actions were neither
sufficiently severe nor sufficient to state a quid pro quo cause for
Rights Act specifically permits punitive damages up to $5000. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3213(D) (1995).
71. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 587. For a list of appellate decisions denying relief to employees suing
employers in their individual capacity, see Stefanski v. Zehetner & Assocs., 855 F. Supp.
1030, 1032-34 (E.D. Wis. 1994). But see Johnson v. University Surgical Group, 871 F.
Supp. 979 (W.D. Oh. 1994) (rejecting Miller, 991 F.2d 583, and finding that a co-
employee supervisor may be personally liable for intentional sexual harassment if the
liability is based on the individual's own acts, as opposed to acts in compliance with
company policy); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989) (allowing facts
to be presented as to whether a supervisor may be considered an "employer" and thus held
liable). A supervisor may be held personally liable for terminating a disabled employee.
Frances A. McMorris, Boss May Be Personally Liable if Firing Violates Disability Law,
WALL ST. J., May 2, 1995, at 1. A state statute may be interpreted to allow a
supervisor to be held personally liable for sexual harassment. See, e.g., Page v. Superior
Ct., 31 Cal.App. 4th 1206 (1995) (supervisor personally liable pursuant to California Fair
Employment and Housing Act).
A CEO in a closely held corporation who is found liable for the tort of sexual
harassment may not be covered by insurance. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Morgan,
Nos. 1 CA-CV 92-0220 & 1 CA-CV 92-0553 (consolidated) 1995 Ariz. App. LEXIS 214
(Sept. 26, 1995) (no coverage for $2.5 million judgment because the harassment was an
intentional act that precluded the duty to defend). The Arizona insurance statute, ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-621 (1995), has been held not to indemnify state employees for
sexual harassment when the acts are beyond the course and scope of employment.
Arizona v. Schallock, No. CA-CV 92-0410, 1995 Ariz. App. LEXIS 177 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Aug. 10, 1995).
73. 834 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. I11. 1993).
74. Id. at 1045 (quoting from plaintiff's amended complaint at p.34).
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harassment." Predictably, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to
include additional facts; e.g., that her employer had also stated that he
"could 'do a lot' for [her]," a comment made when he was criticizing
Anita Hill's testimony in the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings.
7 6
The court found that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts under the
quid pro quo theory in her amended complaint and denied defendant's
motion to dismiss."
Litigation will undoubtedly be stimulated by the creation of sexual
harassment class actions. In December 1991, a federal judge approved
"the first ever sexual harassment class action." 78 The judge permitted
approximately 100 female mine workers of Eveleth Taconite Company to
sue pursuant to the reasonable woman standard. 79 The plaintiffs produced
"a book of about [sixty] photographs of nude photos, amateur cartoons and
graffiti [that were displayed] at the Eveleth facility and in supervisors'
offices .... ,80 "There was [also] testimony that during the class period,
visual references to sex and to woman as sexual objects were found
throughout Eveleth Mines .... "8, The trial court's decision "focused on
male employees' language, finding lhat men vtonsistently refleyed to
women in terms of body parts and commented on specific women's sex
lives. "82 The court found that Eveleth Mines was "male dominated in
terms of the sexualized nature of the workplace. "83 The court concluded
that each woman must show how the defendants' practices of "exposing
women to acts of sexual harassment [were] sufficient to alter the terms or
conditions of the reasonable woman's employment. "84
75. Id.
76. See Johnson v. Indopco, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 670, 673 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
77. Id. at 674. The court later granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Johnson v. Indopco, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
78. Ellen Joan Pollock, Judge Approves First Sex-Bias Class Action, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 18, 1991, at 1; Women Prevail Against Mining Company in First Sexual
Harassment Class Action, 94 DAILY LAB. REP. d17 (BNA), (May 18, 1993), available
in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139
F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991), litigated, 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
79. Jenson, 139 F.R.D. at 665. In Garcia v. Andrews, Inc., 867 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993), the court refused to utilize the reasonable woman standard in an allegation
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
80. Pollock, supra note 78; see Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 879.
81. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 879-80.
92. Minnesota Women Win First Ever Sexual Harassment Class Action Suit, 11
Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA), at 571 (May 18, 1993). See Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 880.
83. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 879.
84. Id. at 876. Some women were subjected to sexually-motivated physical acts.
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Although numerous sexual harassment claims have been made on the
basis of sexually-hostile work environments, there is a limit to the type of
evidence that is admissible to demonstrate the existence of such an
environment. In In re Stroh Litigation,5 a Minnesota court refused to
allow the plaintiffs to submit a television commercial featuring a fictitious
Swedish bikini team descending on an all-male campsite as evidence of a
hostile work environment.86 The court concluded that introduction of this
non-workplace material would be "wasteful and cumulative" 7 and that any
probative value would be "substantially outweighed by the danger of
turning an already complex trial into a forensic enigma."88
Other examples of harassment claims based on a sexually-hostile work
environment include suits brought by a number of waitresses against their
former employer, Hooters Restaurant, in Minneapolis 9 The women
alleged that the sexually provocative uniforms they were ordered by their
employer to wear resulted in sexual harassment by customers. 90 Had the
cases not settled out of court,9' they could have shed light on the issue of
whether an employer may be held liable for sexual harassment by
customers in the workplace. Employer liability for sexual harassment has
been established in a case where cocktail waitresses at a Ramada Inn were
required to flirt with customers and wear revealing attire on certain theme
nights (e.g., "Whips and Chains Night" and "Bikini Night").' An
"These incidents ranged from a male pretending to perform oral sex on a sleeping woman
co-worker to a man touching a woman in an objectionable manner, to women being
presented with various dildos, one of which was named 'Big Red.' However, this conduct
was less common than either visual materials or verbal statements. In fact, few women
raised experiences involving offensive physical conduct." Id. at 880.
85. 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 258 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 1993).
86. Id.; see Christi Harlan, Ad Can't Be Evidence, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1993, at B3.
87. 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 259.
88. Id. On December 1, 1993, the parties agreed to a confidential settlement. See
Former Stroh Brewery Employees Settle Sexual Harassment Suits Against Firm, 230 Daily
Lab. Rep. d8 (BNA), (Dec. 2, 1993), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT File.
89. Andrew Blum, Assumption of Risk Tested in Hooters Suit, NAT'L L.J., May 24,
1993, at 7; International Franchise Sued for Harassment, GAZETTE (Montreal), July 19,
1993, at CI.
90. Blum, supra note 89; International Franchise Sued for Harassment, supra note 89.
Seyen of the cases have been settled out of court. Cesar G. Soriano, Hooter Girls Get
Attention, WASH. Tams, Apr. 16, 1994, at BI.
91. Soriano, supra note 90.
92. EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assocs. 647 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Va. 1986); see Robert
A. Shearer, Sexual Harassment by Nonemployees: Employer Liability for Conduct of Third
Parties, 3 J. INDivmUAL EMPL. RTs. 75, 77-78 (1994-95).
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employer was also held responsible for customer harassment when it
required a female employee to wear a patriotic and "sexually provocative
red, white and blue [Bicentennial] theme costume " 93 and then terminated
her in retaliation after she complained about customer sexual harassment.
94
Many sexual harassment cases, whether filed in federal or state court,
are settled prior to trial. In August 1995, the EEOC negotiated a $1.2
million settlement with Del Laboratories of Farmingdale, New York, on
behalf of fifteen female employees who claimed they were subjected to
obscene and sexually abusive behavior by their executive superior. 95 "The
complaint alleged [that the supervisor had] grabbed one woman's left
breast, touched two women on their buttocks, and frequently addressed
female employees with his fly open. ,
96
In February 1995, four female employees settled their sexual
harassment case against the Chevron Corporation for $2.2 million plus
legal fees.' The four plaintiffs, as well as twenty-four of their female co-
workers, had written to Chevron to complain about both sexual harassment
and sex discrimination in the workplace. Two of the plaintiffs claimed to
'have been singled out and subject to ievaiato y managemeit ac.tons; one,
who received $1.3 million in the settlement, "had received through inter-
office mail pornography showing sexual torture and bonidage." 98 The
women also claimed they "would boot their computers and find a graphic
of a man masturbating, or [e]-mail lists of reasons why beer is better than
women. " 99 In April 1991, twenty-two female correction officers settled
their claims, which included sexual harassment, against New York City.
93. Shearer, supra note 92, at 78.
94. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see
Shearer, supra note 92, at 78. The author opines, there have been few reported cases
of employer liability for third-party sexual harassment notwithstanding the EEOC
guidelines of 1980 (Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604
(1995)) that established liability for this kind of activity. Id. at 75.
95. Firm To Pay $1.2 Million In Sex Harassment Case, 15 Women File Complaints
About Chief Executive, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 4, 1995, at A2.
96. Id.
97. Tamar Lewin, Chevron Settles Sexual Harassment Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1995, at A16.
98. Id.
99. Id. The legal fees of the plaintiffs may be as much as $1 million. Jorge Aquino,
Chevron's Road to Settlement, RECORDER (American Lawyer Media, L.P.), Mar. 15,
1995, at 1. The plaintiffs were denied class action certification for their claim of sexual
harassment. Id.
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Each plaintiff will receive between $55,000 and $160,000 in the
settlement. 0o
In March 1993, former Minnesota Stars owner Norm Green was sued
by his former executive assistant who claimed she had been sexually
harassed by Green.1"' Although Green insisted he never pressured the
plaintiff to have sex and filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's lawyer
insisted that the question of whether Green had pressured the plaintiff to
have sex was irrelevant and that she had an actionable claim because
Green had made frequent comments about her appearance and had kissed
her."°2 The case was settled in February 1994; Green is believed to have
agreed to pay $500,000 on settlement and another $250,000 each year for
six years thereafter. 103
Sometimes an employer's settlement of a sexual harassment claim will
encourage, rather than end, the filing of sexual harassment complaints by
its other employees. In 1992, Geffen Records paid a estimated $500,000
settlement to end a suit by a former female secretary who alleged sexual
harassment, assault, and battery. 1" 4 Almost immediately thereafter, a
former Geffen promotions director announced she would file a $5 million
suit for sexual harassment against the company.10 5 The plaintiff in the
second case claimed that she had been subjected to verbal and physical
abuse and that her supervisor had, on one occasion, "unzipped his trousers
and displayed his penis.""
Notwithstanding the risk of opening the door to disgruntled
employees, it is often easier to settle a sexual harassment case than to
100. Selwyn Raab, Correction Officers Settle Lawsuit over Pregnancy Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at B1.
101. Stars' Green Settles Lawsuit, GAZEr-rE (Montreal), February 25, 1994,
(Sportsline in Brief) at C5; Football [sic] Owner Accused of Sexual Harassment, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 28, 1994, at 6.
102. Green Admits Kissing Employees, GAZETrE (Montreal), Feb. 2, 1994, (Sportsline
in Brief) at Fl.
103. Stars' Green Settles Lawsuit, supra note 101; Cheryl Johnson, Most Women
Would Rather Be Dead than Wear a Dress like That, STAR TRmUNE, Mar. 8, 1994, at 3B.
104. Geffen Firm Said to Settle Case of Sex Harassment, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1992,
(Home ed. - Calendar) at Fl. Assault and battery are intentional torts generally not done
within the scope of employment. A clever plaintiff's lawyer will argue an employer's
liability under a theory of negligent hiring/retention which often will survive a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment. See, e.g., Beam v. Concord Hospitality, Inc., 873 F.
Supp. 491 (D. Kan. 1994) (applying Kansas law).




pursue litigation. In a different entertainment industry sexual harassment
case, a former Hollywood tour employee claimed her two bosses had
pinched and fondled her, and accused one boss of "masturbating in front
of her."' 7 Although the plaintiff sued for $10 million, she settled for
$600,000 after fifteen hours of mediation. 0" Finally, in another sexual
harassment suit, The Santa Cruz Operation, a software firm, settled out of
court with four plaintiffs for $1.25 million.109
If settlement fails, and assuming the defendant's motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment is not granted, the next step is a trial. A typical
plaintiff may allege state and federal statutory harassment, as well as
assault, battery, emotional distress, and other causes of action. A plaintiff
seeking to bring his or her case to trial may experience considerable
delays. In Currie v. Kowalewski,"0 for example, the plaintiff alleged her
employer sexually harassed her at work from August 1989 until she was
constructively discharged in August 1990. " After receiving a right to sue
letter from the EEOC in 1991, she commenced litigation against her
employer." 2  Specifically, she claimed, without any corroborating
witnesses, that her employer had asked her and other female employees to
have his baby, gave her twenty to thirty "full-body hugs" (over half of
which were seen by other employees) and made other objectionable
gestures." 3 Her employer had not, however, made "any work-related
promises . . . for the exchange of sexual favors. " "'
107. Chuck Philips, MCA Settles Sexual Harassment Lawsuit, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 2,
1993, (Home ed.) at BI.
108. Chuck Philips, $10 Million Suit Claims Harassment by Managers at Universal
Studios Tour, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, (Home ed.) at BI; Philips, supra note 107.
109. Barbara Jorgensen, Warning: Sexual Harassment Can Be Dangerous to Your
Company's Health, ELEC. Bus., May 1993, at 53; Santa Cruz Operation Under Fire for
Golden Handshake to Michels, COMPUTERGRAM INT'L, May 20, 1993, available in WL,
TRD&IND Database.
Recently, after Paula Coughlin was awarded $6.7 million against the Hilton Hotel
for negligent supervision during the Tailhook Association convention, two other
complainants subsequently settled their suits for "undisclosed sums." 2 Women Settle
Their Tailhook Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1994, at A46.
110. 810 F. Supp. 31 (N.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated, 14 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 1993), 842 F.
Supp. 57 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd without op., 40 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1994).
111. Currie, 810 F. Supp. at 33-34.
112. Id. at 33.
113. Id.
114. Currie, 842 F. Supp. at 60.
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The trial court first held that the plaintiff failed to prove that a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would have found the
conditions offensive or repulsive"' and also held that the plaintiff failed to
prove that she was constructively discharged. l6 However, the appellate
court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case. "' On remand, the trial
court rejected the plaintiff's testimony that the defendant had touched her
sexually,"' but accepted as credible her testimony that she was sexually
harassed. 19 In 1994, the court finally awarded the plaintiff a total of
$13,419 in back pay (unemployment and salary payments), prejudgment
interest of $3011, and suggested she apply for an award of attorney fees
and costs. 2 A plaintiff may also experience considerable trauma resulting
from exposure of intimate personal activities. In Martin v. Cavalier Hotel
Corp., 12 1 a plaintiff who alleged she was raped several times at the
workplace was asked to testify about whether she watched x-rated films or
engaged in premarital sex. 2 2 Although the jury rejected her claims of
sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
wrongful termination, the plaintiff succeeded in her claims of assault,
battery, and constnxetie discharge.
123
In Frederick v. Shaw, 124 the jury concluded that the plaintiff had
proven the existence of a hostile work environment and had made out
claims for sexual harassment and defamation against her former employer
and lover, but rejected allegations of sex discrimination, quid pro quo
sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
battery.2 5 The plaintiff began working as an associate attorney for the
115. Currie, 810 F. Supp. at 36.
116. Id.
117. Currie, 14 F.3d at 590.
118. Currie, 842 F. Supp. at 61.
119. Id. at 60.
120. Id. at 64.
121. 48 F.3d 1343 (4th Cir. 1995). The jury assessed the corporation $80,000
(including $50,000 punitive damages), and the supervisor was assessed $22,000 (including
$15,000 punitive damages). See id. at 1348. The judge awarded the plaintiff $22,320 in
back pay and approximately $100,000 in attorney fees. See id.
122. See Ellen E. Schultz & Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs' Sex Lives Are
Being Laid Bare in Harassment Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al (detailing
some testimony in the Martin trial).
123. See Martin, 4% F.3d at ,34.
124. No. 92-0592, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1809 (E.D. Pa Feb. 18, 1994).
125. Id. at *7. The defamation claim consisted of the defendant Glanton stating that
the plaintiff was disturbed, under psychiatric care, an extortionist for filing the lawsuit,
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defendant's law firm in 1987,126 and in 1989 began a sexual relationship
with her superior in order "to stay in [the superior's] good graces." 127 In
1990, when she ended the relationship, she was terminated. 121 While
agreeing that the defendant's unwelcome sexual advances had created a
hostile work environment, the jury declined to award any damages on that
cause of action. 29 However, on the defamation claim, the jury awarded
the plaintiff $100,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive
damages because it found that at least one of the defendant's comments
after the filing of the complaint, but before the commencement of the trial,
were defamatory. 3 0
More typical would be the case of Sandra Huffman against the Pepsi-
Cola Company and two of its employees, '' in which Ms. Huffman
received an award of approximately $740,879 (including $212,000 in
punitive damages) against Pepsi, $24,500 against the two employees, and
$756,341 in attorney fees against Pepsi. 3 2 Pepsi was also ordered to pay
a civil penalty of $100,000 to the State of Minnesota.'33 Huffinan had
claimed she was subjected to nude photos, cat calls, and unwelcome
touching in the workplace, as well as retaliation after she complained to
supervisors about offensive behavior. 34 Furthermore, she also claimed to
have been threatened with a knife by an employee who had a prior record
of assaulting other employees. 35  The trial court concluded that the
harassment was so severe that the plaintiff was constructively
discharged. 36 Also typical would be the sexual harassment claims brought
and that she was fired from her former job. Id. at *31-32.
126. Id. at *6.
127. Id. at *7.
128. Id. at *8-9.
129. Id. at *4.
130. Id. at *4, *41. See Richard B. Schmitt, Trial Lawyers Pinpoint Areas for
Litigation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1993, at Bl; Dale Russakoff, Lawyer Found To Have
Harassed Associate, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1993, at D1.
131. Huffman v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., C7-94-2404, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 943
(Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 1995). See also Claire Carter, Sexual Harassment Suit-Rights
v. Corporate Hubris, STAR TRiB., Mar. 7, 1994, at D3; Women Awarded $530,000 in Sex
Harassment Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 19, 1994, at A16.
132. Huffman, C7-94-2404, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 943, at *12.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *2-3.
135. Id. at *10.
136. See id. at *7. The appellate court reduced the legal fees to $400,000. Id. at *27.
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by two female employees who alleged their employer used "vulgarities,
talked about sex acts, grabbed a worker's buttocks and asked for a
goodbye kiss." 1 7 The employees were awarded $26,500 (including in
$9000 punitive damages) and $65,000 (including in $25,000 punitive
damages) respectively.
138
In 1991, two female officers with the Long Beach Police Department
won a $3.1 million award after showing that male officers called one
vulgar names, exposed the other to graphic sexual language, and had
placed both female officers in physical danger. 139 In 1989, a billing clerk
won a $625,000 jury verdict" against her employer based on her assertion
that her supervisor had made "daily comments on the breasts, buttocks,
and physical appearance of individual women; suggestions to women that
they show [him] 'a good time';"'' and had enacted "job standards for
women employees that included the wearing of dresses or skirts, nylons
and heels specifically so that he could admire women employees' legs.'1
42
When the plaintiff complained, she was subjected to retaliatory
measures. 1
43
Sexual harassment litigation has yielded widely 'Jary1mg damage
awards. In Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie,144 a legal secretary claimed that
the world's largest law firm condoned a partner's bawdy remarks and
clumsy gropings. 145 The partner's offensive conduct consisted of placing
The court also opined that deference to a trial court finding "is especially strong in
employment discrimination cases." Id. at *5 (quoting Kay v. Peter Motor Co., 483
N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. App. 1992)).
137. Ann Merrill, Hennepin County District Judge Rules Executive, Meadowbrook
Press Guilty of Sex Harassmnent; 2 Former Employees Are Awarded a Total of $136,500
in Suits, STAR TRm., March 9, 1994, at DI.
138. Id.
139. Roxana Kopetman, Two Ex-Long Beach Policewomen Settle Sex Harassment
Lawsuit; Courts: City Will Pay Nearly $3 Million, L.A. TIMS, Oct. 14, 1993, at B3.
Rather than pursue an appeal, the city settled the case more than two years after the jury
award by paying one plaintiff $906,300 and the other $803,700 (the lawyer received $1.14
million). Id. The story was the basis for a movie entitled With Hostile Intent. Id.
140. See Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. Id.
142. Id. The plaintiff received $125,000 in general damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge for
protesting sexual harassment. Id. at 1373. See also Tamar Lewin, The Thomas
Nomination: A Case Study of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TmEs, Oct- 1.1, 1991, at AS.
143. Dias, 919 F.2d at 1373.
144. No. 943043 (Ca. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1994).
145. See Barry A. Hartstein, Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie: A Potential "Blueprint"
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candy in the plaintiff's dress pocket, placing the plaintiff in immediate fear
of his touching her breast, having repeatedly asked her "what's the wildest
thing you've ever done?"' 46 and having "grabbed her butt. 1 47 Although
the plaintiff worked at the firm less than ninety days, 148 suffered no wage
loss, 149 and was subjected to the abusive partner for only two weeks, 150
evidence at trial indicated that other female employees had complained of
that particular partner's actions for six years.'' It was only after Ms.
Weeks's litigation and the pre-trial proceedings that the firm discharged
him.1 2  The jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 (out of a requested
$600,000'"1) for emotional distress154 and, in the second phase of the trial,
punitive damages of $6.9 million against the firm' (she requested $3.5
million1 56) and $225,000 against the lawyer personally.1
5 7
In 1993, a jury awarded $81,750 to a female sheriff's deputy in her
sexual harassment suit against Los Angeles County. 58 The jury heard the
plaintiff's testimony that she had been
for Sexual Harassment Litigation, 20 EMPL. REL. L.J. 657 (Spring 1995). The
defendant's legal fees are estimated at over $1 million, id. at 659, and it was ordered to
pay about $500,000 of plaintiff's legal fees. Id. at 658. See also Jane Gross, Jury
Awards $Z1 Million in Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at A16.
146. See Hartstein, supra note 145, at 658.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 662.
149. See Jane Gross, Big Law Firm Is Held Liable in Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 1994, at Al.
150. See Hartstein, supra note 145, at 658.
151. See Gross, supra note 149.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Hartstein, supra note 145, at 661.
155. See id. at 657.
156. Id. at 662.
157. See id. at 658. The punitive award was reduced to $3.5 million. See Hartstein,
supra note 145, at 658; Sex-Harassment Award Reduced, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at
A22. In August 1995, Baker and McKenzie settled a sexual harassment suit by another
former associate female attorney for an undisclosed amount. Barbara Steuart, Baker &
McKenzie, Greenstein Settle Former Associate's Harassment Suit, RECORDER (American
Lawyer Media, L.P.), Aug. 30, 1995, at 4.
158. See Kenneth Reich, Deputy Opts for New Sex Harassment Trial, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1993, (Home ed.) at B3.
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"subjected ... to an environment where sexually abusive and
degrading language in referring to all women was
commonplace," where male officers would grab their crotches
and make suggestive comments, where she was given "bad shift
assignments" after filing grievances, was routinely made the
object of posters with sexual themes, and was placed in
dangerous situations.'59
The judge reduced the award to $20,000, which was particularly
disappointing to the plaintiff who had earlier rejected a $40,000 settlement
offer. 160
In Stafford v. Missouri,'6 ' the plaintiff, an investigator at a Missouri
state prison, accused various supervisors of violating her civil rights,
sexual harassment, and sex discrimination. 62 Certain defendants and
causes of action were dismissed, but the jury found one defendant's
sexually harassing conduct had violated the plaintiff's civil rights and
assessed $43,500 in damages, 163 plus $1 in punitive damages, against
him. ' The jury also found a second defendant liable and assessed
$101,500165 ($65,800 of which was for constructive discharge 66) and an
additional $1 in punitive damages against him.167 However, the trial
judge, in a post-trial motion, concluded that as a matter of law there was
insufficient evidence to find liability on the part of the first defendant
68
and that "[defendant's] [m]otion for a [n]ew [tfrial [would] be granted if
for any reason his [j]udgment [a]s a [m]atter of [l]aw is vacated." 69 The
court also reversed $65,800 of the amount assessed against the second
defendant because it concluded that there was no evidence for the jury to
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. 835 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. Mo. 1993).
162. See id. at 1139. If the defendant is a state or state subdivision, a plaintiff.may
sue the offending supervisor. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williams v. Dunning, 816 F. Supp.
418 (E.D. Va. 1993).
163. Stafford, 835 F. Supp. at 1139.
164. Id. at 1140.
165. Id. at 1139.
166. Id. at 1139-40.
167. Id. at 1140.
168. Id. at 1143.
169. Id. at 1144.
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award damages against him for constructive discharge. 7' Thus, the
plaintiff received a total of $35,700 and an additional $1 for punitive
damages.
In Thoresen v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,1 the plaintiff, a former
Penthouse "Pet of the Year," was awarded $60,000 in compensatory
damages 72 and $4 million in punitive damages.' 73 The court reviewed the
sexual harassment allegations under New York's Human Rights Law 74 and
concluded that the plaintiff had been pressured into having sex with
various associates of Penthouse's owner and found that such "[s]exual
slavery was not a part of her job description."175  The court found that
sexual favors were an implied condition of her continued employment1
76
and specifically found that she had had an eighteen-month relationship with
a British financial advisor and a single liaison with an Italian furniture
manufacturer. 77 The court concluded that she was terminated because she
refused to engage in a sexual relationship with a Japanese businessman.' 78
The amount of punitive damages was based on a stipulation between the
parties that, should they be awarded to the plaintiff, Penthouse had a
market value of $200 million and its owner was worth $150 million.1
79
On appeal, at least ten amici curiae briefs were filed on Ms.
Thoresen's behalf, including those of the National Organization for
Women, the National Women's Party, Women Against Pornography, and
Feminists Against Pornography. 80 A majority of the Appellate Division
court affirmed the compensatory damages award, but reversed the $4
million punitive damage award because they concluded it was not
authorized under the New York Human Rights Law.' 8' In a bitter dissent,
170. Id. at 1146-47.
171. 583 N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), modifying and aff'g, 563 N.Y.S.2d
968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 591 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. 1992).
172. Thoreson, 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 972.
173. Id. at 977.
174. Thoreson, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 215-18; see N.Y. ExEcurivE LAW §§ 290-301
(Consol. 1995).
175. Thoreson, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
176. Id. at 972.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 971.
179. Id. at 977.
180. 583 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
181. Id. at 218. It is conceivable that there might be a cause of action under federal
law but not state law. For example, in Champion v. Nationwide Security, Inc., 517
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Justice Wallach argued that the entire case should have been dismissed . 8 2
He placed significant emphasis on the plaintiff's past criminal record and
sexual promiscuity: namely, that she had been convicted of felonies, had
a prior history of prostitution, and had performed lesbian love scenes and
another sexually explicit act in a Penthouse film, Caligula."3 The
dissenting view, perhaps, would have made it permissible for courts to
examine and either reduce or eliminate a damage award on the basis of a
claimant's lifestyle.
An award might also be reversed on appeal because of a mistake
made by the trial judge. Christine Gierlinger, a former New York State
Trooper, claimed that her constitutional rights were violated when she was
terminated in retaliation for filing sexual harassment complaints. 4 The
jury returned a $340,000 verdict against only one of the plaintiff's
supervisors.8 5  The award was set aside on appeal because the court
concluded that the jury was uncertain as to which legal principle it should
apply as a result of its factual finding. 8 6  In Baskerville v. Culligan
International Co. , 87 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a
$25,000 judgment for the plaintiff because it found the offending
comments at issue (e.g. "pretty girls run around naked" and "um urn
um") were insufficient to establish an action for sexual harassment."88
According to the court, even if the remarks were actionable, the employer
would not be liable for sexual harassment because it "took all reasonable
steps to protect [the plaintiff] from [the harasser]."
89
A plaintiff claiming to have been sexually harassed will often dually
plead an action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress or,
occasionally, negligent infliction of emotional distress. The latter,
however, may be barred by the exclusivity of the state workers'
N.W.2d 777, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), a woman had no cause of action for rape by
her immediate supervisor pursuant to Michigan law, but may have had a cause of action
pursuant to federal guidelines.
182. Id. at 218 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 219-20.
184. See Gierlinger v. New York State Police, 15 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1994); Error
in Jury Instructions Entitles Former Police Commander to New Trial, 32 Gov't Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 221 (Feb. 14, 1994).
185. Error in Jury Instructions Entitles Former Police Commander to New Trial, supra
note 184.
186. Gierlinger, 15 F.3d at 34.
187. 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).




compensation statute. 190 To succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the complainant must prove that the defendant's actions
were outrageous and intentional. Absent a finding of outrageousness,
many courts are reluctant to allow such a cause of action. In Obendorfer
v. Gitano Group, Inc., the plaintiff's supervisor allegedly made
degrading comments about her and women in general, but a New Jersey
court found that the comments did not reach the requisite level of
outrageousness' 9 and the employer, at most, was negligent in failing to
supervise the employee.' 93 In Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., S. C.,9
the court denied relief to a complainant notwithstanding her claims of
being subjected to offensive and tasteless humor of a sexual nature, being
made the subject of rumors of misconduct, and of having been made to
undertake demeaning work assignments. 95 Applying Illinois law, which
requires more than sexual harassment to state a cause of action for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 19 6 the court concluded that "in
the employment setting, the conduct complained of must be particularly
outrageous. The work setting contemplates a degree of teasing and
190. See, for example, Kelly v. First Virginia Bank-S.W., 404 S.E.2d 723 (Va. 1991),
where plaintiff alleged her immediate supervisor consistently harassed her sexually and
that management's only reaction was to further intimidate her. Irrespective of her
allegations of emotional distress and constructive discharge, the Virginia Supreme Court
restricted her remedy to workers' compensation. But, see Kerans v. Porter Paint Co.,
61 Ohio St. 3d 486 (1991), where the Ohio Supreme Court refused to allow the workers'
compensation statute to be the exclusive remedy for claims of sexual harassment.
191. 838 F. Supp. 950 (D.N.J. 1993).
192. Id. at 955.
193. Id.
194. 841 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. I11. 1994).
195. Id. at 831. In Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), a
Texas appellate court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim when complainant alleged the following three
instances: (1) her supervisor observed "her from top to bottom" which made her feel
uncomfortable and naked; (2) he flicked the lights and asked her if she did her best work
in the dark; and (3) he told her his wife's magazine discussed "the different sizes and
shapes of men and what they did right or wrong 'in the sack."' Id. at 410. But see
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 130 L.
Ed. 2d 636 (1995). The court stated that it was "unprepared to hold as a matter of law
that public humiliation of an employee by her employer, accomplished through rude, crude
sexually explicit remarks and actions, cannot constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress." Id. at 1466-67.
196. Piech, 841 F. Supp. at 831.
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taunting that in other circumstances might be considered cruel and
outrageous. "197
It must be emphasized, however, that absent a federal or state statute,
the majority rule is still that an employer is liable for the sexual
harassment of its supervisor against an employee only if the supervisor
either acts within the scope of his or her employment or the employer
either knew or should have known of the supervisor's harassment. In
Smith v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc.,198 the
plaintiff alleged that her supervisor had
grabbed or touched [her] breasts, rubbed up against her, touched
her leg under her dress, threw a condom on her desk, and tossed
candy down the front of her blouse, all in the view of other
employees. . . .On at least four occasions, he forced her to have
sex with him at various locations in [the employer's] building.
Smith submitted to [her supervisor's] sexual advances because
she felt physically threatened by him. "I
The plaintiff never informed the corporation of her supervisor's
behavior even though American Express had a policy that dealt with
sexual harassment and a procedure providing for reporting such
harassment.2°° When American Express finally learned of the harassment,
it immediately began an investigation.01  As American Express
demonstrates, a court will often award summary judgment to an employer
if the employer responds promptly and adequately to a hostile work
environment claim.
Attorneys' fees are generally only awarded if the plaintiff has been at
least partly successful in litigation. For example, in Parton v. GTE North,
Inc. ,22 although the plaintiff only received damages of $1 on her sexual
harassment claim,2 °3 she was awarded $26,292.63 out of a requested
197. Id. (citation omitted).
198. 876 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
199. Id. at 1169; accord Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co., 843 F. Supp. 1278,
1284 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (plaintiff may have been a victim of hostile work environment but
failed to file a complaint regarding the abuses she allegedly suffered).
200. Smith, 876 P.2d at 1169.
201. Id.
202. 802 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mo. 1991), 802 F. Supp. 255 (W.D. Mo. 1991)
(separate proceeding on costs and attorneys' fees), aff'd, 971 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1992).
203. Parton, 802 F. Supp. at 255.
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$92,858.21 for legal fees and expenses. 2°4  In Walker v. Anderson
Electrical Connectors,"5 the circuit court relied on the fact that the jury
found the defendant "had committed acts of sexual harassment"2 °6 but did
not award any damages to the plaintiff because it found she had "sustained
no monetary damage." 207  The court noted that the plaintiff had not
requested nominal damages and presumed that she had not done so
because, as the appellee's brief stated, "the jury might have given it, and
that was a risk to be avoided by the plaintiff since she was after substantial
money."20 8 Thus, the court refused to award attorneys' fees.209
The trial judge has considerable discretion in awarding attorneys' fees
should the plaintiff be partly successful.210 In Stewart v. Weis Markets,21 '
the plaintiff, who was subject to a sexually hostile work environment, was
awarded $27,478212 instead of the advisory jury award of $139,125.213
The plaintiff's lawyer requested the court to award legal fees of
$34,347.214 The court granted the plaintiff's request but reduced the
amount by twenty percent to more accurately reflect the fees charged by
attorneys and paralegals who have abilities and experience similar to that
of the plaintiff's counsel2 15 and to account for the fact that the plaintiff was
unsuccessful in some of her causes of action, such as one for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.21 6
204. Id. at 256, 257-58.
205. 944 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1992).
206. Id. at 843.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 845 n.7.
209. Id. at 843.
210. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983).
211. 890 F. Supp. 382 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
212. Id. at 400.
213. Id. at 385. The plaintiff was originally granted a jury trial based on the court's
ruling that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied retroactively to claims arising before the
Act's November 21, 1991 effective date. Id. However, the Supreme Court subsequently
ruled in Langraf v. US! Film Production, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), that the Act did not
apply retroactively. Thus, the court reversed itself and decided to consider the jury award
an advisory verdict. Stewart, 890 F. Supp. at 385.
214. Stewart, 890 F. Supp. at 397.
215. Id. at 400.
216. Id.
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Sexual workplace litigation has lead to certain unpredictable results.
In one highly unusual case, a male supervisor received a jury award of
$251,000 when he claimed he was fired for reporting the sexual
harassment of a female co-worker to management. 1 7 Several months after
he reported the complaint, the same woman accused the plaintiff of
making unwelcome sexual advances toward her. 18 Upon completion of
the investigation of the accusation, the company concluded that there was
no sexual harassment, but terminated the plaintiff for having made false
statements in his sexual harassment report.1 9 Perhaps the most bizarre
result occurred in Snyder v. Helena Laboratory, Inc.,220 where a Texas
appellate court concluded that respective spouses of adulterous employees
could sue the employer on a theory of negligent interference with familial
relations for allowing the liaison and failing to take action to prevent the
affair.2 2 ' The appellate court opined that the workplace should be a place
where "spouses should be secure in the knowledge that employers will not
condone [this] type [of] activity, ' 222 and that if employers breach their
duty, "courts will provide a remedy." 223 The dissent queried that "[i]f the
business sector is legally and morally responsible and obligated to monitor
the personal lives of its employees, then should not government do
likewise for all its citizenry? ' 224 It should be noted, however, that an
employer's "no dating" policy might violate either a state statute or
otherwise result in litigation. Approximately twenty states prohibit an
employer from enforcing such a policy on the basis of off-duty contact
217. Fired Salesman Wins Quarter Million for Discharge Over Filing Complaint, 11
BNA's EMPLOYEE REL. WKLY. 411 (Apr. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Fired Salesman]; see
Baufield v. Safelight Glass Corp., 829 F. Supp. 285 (D. Minn. 1993), 831 F. Supp. 713
(1993) (plaintiff's application for award of prejudgment interest and costs and attorneys'
fees).
218. Fired Salesman, supra note 217.
219. Id. The plaintiff received $201,000 for the defendant's violation of Minnesota's
Whistle Blower Act, MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (1994), and $50,000 for defamation, see 831
F. Supp. at 716, and $119,752 in attorney fees and costs. Id. at 722.
220. 877 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 886 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
221. Id. at 37.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 39. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, 886 S.W.2d 767 (1994), because
the cause of action was essentially an alienation of affection action barred by Texas law.
Id. at 768. The Texas Supreme Court also stated that Texas law "never recognized an
independent cause of action for negligent interference with the familial relationship." Id.
See also Tessie Borden, Definition Has Changed as Litigants Push Limits, HOUSTON
PosT, Sept. 4, 1994, at Al.
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between employees .225 A former manager received a $375,000 jury award
against IBM, and two former employees of Rohr, Inc., an aerospace
company, were awarded $4 million for being terminated because one, a
supervisor, had dated the other, a subordinate.226
One company faced with sexual harassment allegations made a prompt
investigation and fired the man it concluded had harassed female
employees with lewd gestures and language.227 When the firm received
a $282,000 settlement demand letter from the employee's lawyer, it
immediately filed suit seeking declaratory relief that it had done nothing
wrong.228 Predictably, the terminated male employee has sued the
company for libel and for wrongful discharge.229
In Texas, a deputy was accused by a female supervisor of sexual
harassment. When the supervisor publicized the alleged activities in
television and press interviews, the defendant, in a countersuit, alleged
defamation and was awarded $3 million in November 1994 by a federal
jury.23 Similarly, a Continental Airlines pilot, cleared of sex harassment
allegations concerning stewardesses, sued the airline for $1 million for
various causes of action, including defamation. 231 He claimed that in order
to litigate he had been forced to discuss highly intimate details of his
personal life.232 The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, had ordered
him to respond to Continental's discovery requests which required him to
list the names of all individuals with whom he had had an intimate
relationship or even a date within the prior five years.233
225. Alex Markels, Employers' Dilemma: Whether to Regulate Romance, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 14, 1995, at BI.
226. Id.
227. Ellen Joan Pollock, Company Takes Novel Approach to Sexual-Harassment
Charges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1994, at B6.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Kathleen Murray, A Backlash on Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1994, at 23. "I may never see a cent, but at least I got my name cleared." Id. (the
deputy's comment after the $3 million verdict).
231. Kathleen Murray, A Backlash on Harassment Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1994, (Late ed.) at 23.
232. Id.
233. Id. According to plaintiffs attorney in Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, corporate
attorneys "want to show that the plaintiff is a nut or a slut." Schultz & Woo, supra note
122. Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence has been amended by the recent Crime
Bill so as to restrict significantly inquiries into an alleged victims sexual predisposition and
sexual behavior. See Sec. 40141(b) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
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Should an employee's complaint be frivolous or brought in bad faith,
an employer may be successful in obtaining attorneys' fees and costs.
234
In Pope v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. ,235 the plaintiff alleged both
sexual and racial harassment.236 Two months before termination, the
plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim that stated harassment as the
reason for her termination.237  In rejecting the plaintiffs harassment
claims, the court wondered "hibow something which has not yet occurred
can be asserted as evidence of an earlier discriminatory act was never
explained." 23  The court also disregarded her lawyer's request that the
shorter state statute upon which he based the plaintiff's case be disregarded
since it time-barred any relief and that the federal court apply the federal
statute instead. 239 "We do not make the federal statutory laws, much less
legislate state statutes of limitations. We have no prerogative to ignore a
precise Texas time limitation. "240
III. CANADA
Since the late 1980s, folio-wing the Supreme Court of Canada's
decisions in Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board)24 and Janzen v. Platy
Enterprises Ltd. ,24 Canadian courts have recognized sexual harassment
"as being discrimination on the basis of sex or gender." 243  Sexual
harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, is prohibited under the
Canadian Human Rights Act and the human rights legislation of each
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. Discovery of a complainants
workplace sexual activity may be utilized by a terminated supervisor suing for wrongful
discharge. Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 31t (S.D. Iowa 1992) (denying femate
worker's non-party motion for a protection order).
234. See, e.g., Pope v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 264-65 (5th
Cir. 1991).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 260; she never timely contested the attorney's fee award of $78,768.99.
Id. at 262.
237. Id. at 260.
238. Id. at 265.
239. Id. at 263-64.
240. Id. at 264.
241. J1987) 2 S.C.R. 84.
242. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
243. Shirish P. Chotalia, Sexual Harassment Laws in Canada-It's All a Question of
Power, J. INDIVIDUAL EMPL, RTS., Dec. 1994-Jan. 1995, at 155-56.
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Canadian province.2 " Unlike the United States, where victims of sexual
harassment may sue under statutory and common law causes of action, a
claimant in Canada may only seek relief for sexual harassment under a
human rights statute.245 Canadian human rights tribunals have relied on
a variety of sources to establish a "definition or description of sexual
harassment, "246 including United States court decisions recognizing two
forms of sexual harassment.24 7 Although the Supreme Court of Canada,
in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. ,248 cited the U.S. Supreme Court case
of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson2 49 with approval, it rejected the
distinction the Court made between quid pro quo and hostile workplace
environment sexual harassment:
The American courts have tended to divide sexual harassment
into two categories: the 'quidpro quo' variety in which tangible
employment-related benefits are made contingent upon
participation in sexual activity, and conduct which creates a
'hostile environment' by requiring employees to endure sexual
gestures and posturing in the workplace... . I do not find this
categorization particularly helpful. While the distinction may
have been important to illustrate forcefully the range of behaviour
that constitutes harassment at a time before sexual harassment
244. See Canadian Human Rights Act, 5 R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985) (Can.); Individual's
Rights Protection Act, 3 R.S.A., ch. 1-2 (1980) (Can.); Human Rights Code, 3 R.S.B.C.,
ch. 186 (1979) (Can.); Human Right Code, R.S.M., ch. 45 (1987-88) (Can.); Human
Rights Act, 2 R.S.N.B., ch. H-11 (1973) (Can.); Act Respecting the Protection of Human
Rights, 5 NFLD. R.S., ch. H-14 (1990) (Can.); Human Rights Act, 2 R.S.N.S., ch. 130
(1967) (Can.); Human Rights Code, 5 R.S.O., ch. H-19 (1990) (Can.); Human Rights
Act, 2 R.S.P.E.I., ch. H-12 (1988) (Can.); Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,
R.S.Q., ch. C-12 (1977) (Can.); Act Respecting the Saskatchewan Code of Human Rights
and its Administration, S.S., ch. S.-24.1 (1979) (Can.). See also ARiUN P. AGGARWAL,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 57 (2d ed. 1992).
245. AGGARWAL, supra note 244, at 237. Aggarwal also suggests that the equality
rights clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms might create a right of civil
action for sexual harassment. Id. at 240.
246. Id. at 57. In particular, Canadian authorities have relied upon Professor
Catharine MacKinnon's book Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case Study of
Discrimination, published by Yale University Press in 1979. See, e.g., Janzen v. Platy
Enters. Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252, 1279-80.
247. See, e.g., Janzen, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1284 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
248. [19891 1 S.C.R. 1252.
249. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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was widely viewed as actionable, in my view there is no longer
any need to characterize harassment as one of these forms. The
main point in allegations of sexual harassment is that unwelcome
sexual conduct has invaded the workplace, irrespective of
whether the consequences of the harassment included a denial of
concrete employment rewards for refusing to participate in sexual
activity. 2 0
The Janzen Court went on to define sexual harassment broadly as
"unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work
environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims
of the harassment. 
251
Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board),252 which preceded Janzen v.
Platy Enterprises Ltd.,'" is also a landmark sexual harassment case.
Robichaud is significant because it was the first case in which the Supreme
Court of Canada found sexual harassment under the Canadian Human
Rights Act and concluded that sexual harassment in the course of
employment constitutes prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.
254
The Court's decision in Robichaud is also significant because the Court
concluded that an employer may be held liable for the sexually harassing
acts of its employees if such acts occurred in the course of employment
and the employer failed to take remedial action.255 The Robichaud court
noted that although "the conduct of the employer is theoretically irrelevant
to the imposition of liability [on the employer for the actions of its
employee,] [i]ts conduct may preclude or render redundant many of the
contemplated remedies [under the Human Rights Act]. "256 The Court
stated that
250. Janzen, [19891 1 S.C.R. at 1283 (emphasis added). See also Noffke v.
McClaskin Hot House, [19901 11 C.H.R.R. D/407 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry 1989); Cuff v.
Gypsy Restaurant, [1987] 8 C.H.R.R. D/3972 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry); Wilgan v. Wendy's
Restaurants of Can., Inc., [1990] 11 C.H.R.R. D/119 (B.C. Council Human Rts. 1989).
251. Janzen, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1283.
252. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84.
253. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
254. Robichaud, [1987] 2 S.C.R. at 89. Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Robichaud, Canadian courts have "equated sexual harassment with sexual discrimination
to a significant degree." Contenti v. Gold Seats Inc., 11992] 20 C.H.R.R. D174, D179
(Alta. Bd. Inquiry).
255. Robichaud, [1987] 2 S.C.R. at 95-96.
256. Id. at 96.
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an employer who responds quickly and effectively to a complaint
by instituting a scheme to remedy and prevent recurrence will not
be liable to the same extent, if at all, as an employer who fails
to adopt such steps. These matters, however, go to remedial
consequences, not liability.257
Canadian human rights tribunals have held, under Robichaud, that an
employer may be held liable for the harassment of an employee whether
the harassing employee is a supervisor or a coworker of the victim. In
Karlenzig v. Chris 'Holdings Ltd. ,258 for example, the Saskatchewan Board
of Inquiry concluded that Robichaud was "not intended merely to be
confined to situations of a 'supervisory' nature." 259  In Karlenzig, a
waitress alleged that the restaurant's cook had hugged her, grabbed her,
and rubbed his body against hers in a sexual manner. 2' The Board found
the cook's behavior constituted sexual harassment and, notwithstanding the
cook's position as a nonsupervisory coworker, held the employer liable for
failing to take appropriate measures to protect the plaintiff from further
harassment.
26'
Like U.S. courts, Canadian tribunals have found liability in cases
involving same-sex harassment. For example, a British Columbia human
rights tribunal held a male supervisor liable for sexually harassing a male
deckhand.262 The complainant, who claimed that his genitals had been
frequently grabbed by his supervisor, received $2000 in general damages
for hurt feelings and $1760 for lost wages.263 One recent study indicates
that fourteen percent of the 1263 sex discrimination cases filed in Ontario
since 1994 were bought by males.2M6
257. Id. (emphasis added). As a result of Janzen and Robichaud, "the Canadian
Supreme Court clearly defined employer liability as absolute." Chotalia, supra note 243,
at 157. Robichaud received $5000 and other benefits estimated at $80,000. With legal
fees, the cost to the Canadian taxpayer was estimated at $500,000. David Pugliese,
Mounting Harassment Cases Costing Taxpayers Millions, VANc. SUN, Oct. 11, 1994, at
A6.
258. [1991] 15 C.H.R.R. D/5, D/9 (Sask. Bd. Inquiry).
259. Id. at D/9.
260. Id. at D/6.
261. Id. at D/10.
262. Romman v. Sea-West Holdings Ltd., [19891 5 C.H.R.R. D/2312, D/2314-15
(B.C. Human Rts. Trib.).
263. Id. at D/2315.
264. Lubrano, supra note 12. Spokespersons for the Canadian and Ontario Human
Rights Commissions are unaware of female complaints against female supervisors. Id.
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In Canada, as in the U.S., the liability of an employer who harasses
individuals of both sexes is unclear.2 65 In Bailey v. Anmore (Village) ,26
the complainant sued her employer for sexual harassment based on the
actions of a supervisor who had referred to men "as 'idiot,' 'arsehole,' or
'twit,' 267 and had referred to the complainant as "the girl. 268 Since the
supervisor treated females and males equally badly, the British Columbia
Human Rights Council found that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that the abuse was gender-based and therefore concluded that the
complainant had failed to prove her allegations of sexual harassment.269
Even if a tribunal concludes that a complainant employee was not
sexually harassed, an employer might still be held liable if the employee
has been terminated and the filing of a harassment complaint is found to
have been one reason for the termination. For example, although the
Council found in Bailey that the complainant had not been sexually
harassed, it concluded that the supervisor had abused his power and that
the complainant had been terminated after the company was informed
about the possibility that she would file a human rights complaint.270 In
holding the employer liable for a -iolation of the Human Rights Act, the
Council stated that
[i]t is not necessary that a [termination] decision be based solely
on a prohibited ground to constitute a violation of the Human
Rights Act. It is merely necessary that the prohibited basis be
one of the reasons for the decision. [The Council is] satisfied
that the threat of a sexual harassment complaint was a significant
factor in deciding to terminate the complainant.27'
The complainant was ultimately awarded $2000 in lost wages.272
A Canadian employer may also be liable to a supervisor who is
improperly terminated on the basis of a sexual harassment complaint. In
November 1994, an Ontario court awarded $119,000 in back pay and
265. See id.; see also Chotalia, supra note 243, at 161-62.
266. [1992] 19 C.H.R.R. D/369 (B.C. Council of Hum. Rts.).
267. Id. at D/371.
268. Id.
269. Id. at D/376.
210. Id. at D13,79.
271. Id.




$10,000 in general damages to a former General Motors manager who was
terminated after being accused of harassing female employees.273 The
plaintiff, who had asked or attempted to kiss female employees, asked one
female employee to sit on his knee and suggested to another that she take
off her clothes,274 conceded that General Motors had the right to terminate
him.275 However, the plaintiff claimed and the court agreed that he had
been wrongfully dismissed because General Motors failed to implement or
comply with its sexual harassment policy.
276
Like U.S. courts, Canadian human rights tribunals will always find
some sexual harassment complaints insufficient to form the basis of a
sexual harassment claim. In Cohen v. British Columbia Council of Human
Rights,277 for example, a complainant who was fired after being employed
for only two days alleged that she had been terminated because she
complained to a coworker that she had been sexually harassed by a
company salesman.278 In brief, the complainant alleged the salesman had
made her uneasy because "he grinned at her" and "appeared to be
'looking her up and down.' "279 The complainant also alleged the salesman
had caressed her upper thigh.28 0 The British Columbia Council of Human
Rights discontinued the complainant's proceedings against her former
employer, finding that the salesman's touching had been accidental and
that his conduct did not constitute sexual harassment since it was not
"gender based and unwelcome in an objective sense. "2' The complainant
sought review of the Council's decision in the British Columbia Supreme
Court. 282  The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's application for
273. Bannister v. General Motors of Can. Ltd., No. 25, 399/90, 1994 Ont. C.J.
LEXIS 4169, at *45-46. See also Tony Van Alphen, GM Canada Appeals Harassment
Ruling Case Involves Pay Award of $130,000 to Former Manager, TORONTO STAR, Feb.
11, 1995, at C2.
274. Van Alphen, supra note 273.
275. Bannister, No. 25,399/90, 1994 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 4169 at *8. Although the
plaintiff did not contest the allegations of sexual harassment, the court found that the
plaintiffs behavior "was no more and no less than that of the majority of the employees
in [his] department" and that he did not persist "in unwanted social and intimate conduct
when it was made clear to him that any such conduct was not wanted." Id. at *41.
276. Id. at *38.
277. 72 D.L.R.4th 306 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1990).
278. Id. at 308.
279. Id. at 311.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 312.
282. Id. at 307.
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review, finding that she had failed to establish that the Council had either
exceeded its jurisdiction under the British Columbia Human Rights Act or
had made an error in law by discontinuing her proceedings.28 3
In Canada, sexual harassment victims may only seek administrative
relief. Most provinces have administrative human rights commissions or
the equivalent which "operate on a complaint-driven basis. "2s  A
Commission's officer, upon the filing of a complaint, will investigate and
attempt to resolve the matter through settlement.28 5 Of the 218 sexual
harassment claims filed in Ontario in 1993, for example, fifty-three
percent were settled, thirty percent were withdrawn by the complainant,
seven percent were dismissed, and only three percent were brought to an
administrative or judicial tribunal.28 6 If attempts to reach a settlement are
unsuccessful, the Commission will review the complaint and may refer the
matter "to a quasi[-]judicial administrative body for determination."
28 7
The Commission, as a party to complaints it directs to a board or tribunal
for resolution, will also provide specialized legal counsel for the
complainant.288 Although administrative remedies are available, research
has shown that only four out of ten Canadian women who believe they are
victims of workplace sexual harassment take any formal action, and only
one of every two women believe a sexual harassment complaint would be
"taken seriously in the workplace.
289
Under Canadian human rights statutes, a successful sexual harassment
complainant is entitled to receive a general damage award of lost wages
or other remedial measures.2 ° Such damages are usually awarded in low
amounts,29 1 unless the tribunal finds that the defendant wilfully or
recklessly engaged in the discriminatory practice or the complainant
suffered hurt feelings as a result of a wilful or reckless discriminatory
practice. 29 The maximum amount of damages that can be awarded under
the Canadian Human Rights Act for hurt feelings resulting from willful or
283. Id. at 316.
284. Chotalia, supra note 243, at 160.
285. Id.
286. Lubrano, supra note 12.
287. Chotalia, supra note 243, at 160.
288. Id.
289. New Factsheet on Harassment, GAzETTE (Montreal), May 31, 1993, at Dl.
290. Chotalia, supra note 243, at 161.
291. Id.
292. Canadian Human Rights Act, 5 R.S.C., ch. H-6, § 53(3)(b) (1985) (Can.). See
Chotalia, supra note 243, at 164 n.12.
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reckless discriminatory behavior is $5000.293 Most Canadian provinces
also impose specific statutory limits on the amount of exemplary damages
or damages for hurt feelings that may be awarded.294 In the absence
conduct constituting a sexual assault, Canadian human rights tribunals
ordinarily award between $2000 and $3000 as compensation for hurt
feelings.295
Given the high amount of punitive damages or damages for pain and
suffering that have been awarded to sexual harassment victims in the U.S.,
the most striking difference between U.S. and Canadian sexual harassment
law is the low amount of damages that may be awarded in Canada for hurt
feelings or mental anguish. In Ontario, for example, where humiliation
or exemplary damage awards are limited to $10,000 under the Human
Rights Code,2" a successful sexual harassment complainant was awarded
only $2000 for the mental anguish she experienced during a "short but
intense period of harassment." 297 Although the complainant in that case
293. Canadian Human Rights Act, 5 R.S.C., ch. H-6, § 53(3)(b) (1985) (Can.).
294. Under the Manitoba Human Rights Code, for example, punitive damages of up
to $2000 may be assessed against an individual; up to $10,000 in punitive damages may
be assessed against a corporation. Human Rights Code, R.S.M., ch. 45, §§ 43(2)(d)-(3),
51(1)(e)-(t) (1987-88) (Can.). The limit on punitive damages or damages for hurt feelings
in Saskatchewan is $5000. Act Respecting the Saskatchewan Code of Human Rights and
its Administration, S.S., ch. S.-24.1, § 31(B) (1979) (Can.). The Ontario Human Rights
Code permits awards of up to $10,000 for "mental anguish." Human Rights Code, 5
R.S.O., ch. H-19, § 41(1)(b) (1990) (Can.) The Human Rights Code of British Columbia
imposes a ceiling of $5000 on exemplary damages or damages for hurt feelings. Human
Rights Code, 3 R.S.B.C., ch. 186, § 17 (1979) (Can.). The Alberta human rights statute
contains no provision for damages for hurt feelings. See Individual's Right Protection
Act, 3 R.S.A., ch. 1-2, § 31(1) (1980) (Can.).
295. In Dupis v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), [19931 20 C.H.R.R. D/87
(B.C. Council of Hum. Rts.), the British Columbia Council of Human Rights noted that
even cases where "there was physical and verbal harassment," and no statutory limit
placed on damage awards, human rights tribunals have not awarded damages equivalent
to the higher amounts awarded in sexual assault cases. Id. at 98. The Council stated that
in determining the appropriate amount of damages to award for emotional injury, "it is
generally more appropriate to consider damages in other human rights cases than to
consider damages in sexual assault cases." Id. Although the plaintiff in Dupis filed her
sexual harassment complaint before the limit on general damages in British Columbia was
raised from $2000 to $5000, the Council, finding the harassment "at the higher end of the
spectrum," awarded her $5000 in damages for "emotional injury." Id. The ceiling on
general damage awards in sexual harassment cases was raised in 1992 from $2000 to
$5000. Id. at 96. See also Doug Ward, Rise Expected in Complaints, VANC. SUN, Apr.
8, 1995, at B3.
296. Human Rights Code, 5 R.S.O., ch. H-19, § 41(1)(b) (1990) (Can.).
297. Waroway v. Joan and Brian's Upholstering & Interior Decorating Ltd., [19901
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was terminated after only three days of employment, she had been forced
by her employer to listen to dirty jokes and to watch a video of lesbian
lovemaking in the workplace.29 The complainant had also been asked
about her sex life and subjected to other unwelcome remarks.29 The
complainant's allegations were supported by the testimony of other former
female employees who had experienced similar types of sexual harassment
by the employer. 3"
In 1993, Christine Broadfield Watson, the first female supervisor at
the De Haviland/Boeing of Canada aircraft company, alleged she
experienced "a year of daily nastiness by male workers,"3CM ranging from
obscene phone calls to finding "a putty model of a penis ... on her desk
with obscene messages and newspaper cut-outs about the murder of a child
named Christine."3 2 The Ontario Board of Inquiry, finding that
"[Watson] gave as good as she got" in obscene language, awarded her
$1000 for mental anguish due to the corporation's failure to take action.3 °a
16 C.-R.. D1311, D1315 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry). It should be aoted that the plaintiff had
only requested $3000 for emotional anguish. Denise Davy, Woman Seeks $3000 in Sex
Harassment Case Against Ex-Boss, GAZETTE (Montreal), Dec. 21, 1991, at G5.
298. Waroway, [1990] 16 C.H.R.R. at D/315.
299. Id. at D/312.
300. Id. at D/313.
301. Harassment Victory 'a Farce', GAZETrE (Montreal), May 17, 1993, at D1.
302. Broadfield v. De Haviland/Boeing of Canada Ltd., [1993] 19 C.H.R.R. D/347,
D/348, D/350, D/353-54 (Ont. Bd. Inquiry).
303. Id. at D/363, D/368. In a similar case, brought by the first woman to work in
the tinsmith shop of a General Motors division, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion. The plaintiff in that case alleged that her male coworkers made derogatory
comments of a sexual nature to her on a daily basis. Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div.,
General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994). The circuit court of appeals
reversed the district court's finding that because the plaintiff had "'contributed just as
much abusive language and crude behavior as did the male tinners,' . . . '[tihe male
tinners' conduct, to the extent it may have constituted sexual harassment, was not
unwelcome."' Id. at 1010-11 (quoting the district court). The district court had concluded
that the coworkers' behavior "was not actionable, because it had been 'invited'" by the
plaintiff, who had been "'the recipient of crude behavior and crude language ... [and
had] also dished it out."' Id. at 1010 (quoting the district court). The Seventh Circuit
also criticized General Motors' failure to respond to the plaintiff's complaints and its
attempts to justify the behavior of the male workers: "[w]e have trouble imagining a
situation in which male factory workers sexually harass a lone woman in self-defense, as
it wtit; yet that at root is Gte-ral Moators' characterization ef what happened here." Id.
at 1011. On remand, the district court awarded the plaintiff what her attorney requested
in damages; $65,501 in back pay, $37,440 for front pay in lieu of reinstatement, and over
$153,000 in attorneys' fees. Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp.,
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Watson characterized the amount as "hardly a slap on the wrist," and
concluded that "the whole thing was a farce."
304
Manitoba permits exemplary damages of up to $2000 to be awarded
against an individual and up to $10,000 against a corporation.3 °5 In one
case, the provincial Board of Adjudication awarded a receptionist $2000
in exemplary damages, $1000 for hurt feelings, and $6400 in lost wages
as a result of the harassment she experienced during her twelve-day
employment. °  The receptionist's claim that she had been subjected to
unwelcome sexual touching and remarks were corroborated as the
employer's practice by another former employee. 307 The Board concluded
that the plaintiff had been sexually harassed and found the employer to be
"a person who has mistaken employment for slavery and female
employees for concubines. [We] can hardly imagine a more blatant
example of sexual harassment in the workplace." 308  An award of
exemplary damages was permitted because the Board found that the
employer's actions were malicious.30 9
In Quebec, damages for hurt feelings have been awarded in amounts
somewhat higher than those awarded in other provinces. In Quebec
Human Rights Tribunal v. Habachi,310 for example, a teacher was ordered
to pay two female student employees $3000 each in damages for hurt
feelings as well as compensation for lost wages.31 In this case, as in
others, the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal relied heavily on United States
authorities. 3 2 The court, relying on Catherine MacKinnon's arguments,
analyzed the professor-student imposition of sexual conditions to that of
an employer-employee and concluded that both females were victims of
unwanted verbal harassment. 3
No. IP 89-1107-C, slip op. (S.D. Ind. May 11, 1995).
304. Harassment Victory 'a Farce', GAZETrE (Montreal), supra note 301.
305. Human Rights Code, R.S.M., ch. 45, §§ 43(2)(d)-(3), 51(1)(e)-(f) (1987-88)
(Can.).
306. Scott v. Lou's Moving and Storage Ltd., [1992] 18 C.H.R.R. D/143, D/144-46
(Man. Bd. Inquiry).
307. Id. at D/144.
308. Id. at D/145.
309. Id.
310. [1992] 18 C.H.R.R. D/485 (Que. Human Rts. Trib.).
311. Id. at D/497.
312. The tribunal cited Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986), Civil
Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1981), and EEOC, Part 1604-Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex 29 C.F.R. 145 (1991). Id. at D/492-93, D/491, D/492.
313. Id. at D/491-92, D/496 (citing MAcKNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
1996]
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In Gervais v. Vaillancourt,"4 the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal
concluded that the complainant was a victim of unwelcome and
embarrassing sexual remarks and gestures and awarded her $3000 in moral
damages." 5  Exemplary damages were denied because the tribunal
concluded that the perpetrator did not intend the harmful consequences of
his actions.31 6 In Quebec Human Rights Tribunal v. Larouche,317 the
complainant, a secretary, who had resigned because of her employer's
sexual advances, was awarded $6000 in moral damages and for biolafion
of her privacy rights, as well as $2700 in lost wages. 31" The high amount
of moral damages might have been the result of her employer's attempt
not only to force her into his bedroom, but also his comments that he
might rape her.319
The British Columbia Council of Human Rights, in Burton v.
Chalifour Brothers Construction Ltd. ,320 awarded $4500, one of the highest
damage awards ever for hurt feelings, to the only female member of a
carpenters union.321 The plaintiff was discharged for a bona-fide reason
after eleven years of employment.322 In Burton, the harassment continued
for several months and consisted of sexual comments and gestures by male
coworkers, obscene phone calls, and the display of obscene drawings and
a poster depicting a nude female.323 In awarding the plaintiff a high
amount of damages for hurt feelings, the court specifically noted the
psychological impact of the harassment, the Company's "ineffectual
response to [the plaintiffs] complaints" of harassment and its failure to
provide customary private notice and an explanation of the plaintiffs
termination, and the vulnerability of the plaintiff as "the only female
tradesperson employed by the Company. " 324 The hurt feelings award, and
WOMEN" A CASE Op SEX DISCRMINATION 7,235,238 (1979)).
314. [1993] 20 C.H.R.R. D/7 (Que. Hum. Rts. Trib.).
315. Id. at D/14. The Ontario Board of Inquiry, commenting on Gervais, opined it
"would have reservations about an award as high as $3000." Crozier v. Asselstine,
[1994] 22 C.H.R.R. D/244, V/249 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).
316. Gervais, [1993] 20 C.H.R.R. at D/14.
317. [1993] 20 C.H.R.R. D/1 (Que. Hum. Rts. Trib.).
318. Id. at D/6.
319. Id. at D/5-6.
320. [1994] 21 C.H.R.R. D/501 (B.C. Council of Hum. Rts.).
321. Id. at D/508, D/504.
322. Id. at D/506, D/507, D/504.
323. Id. at D/504.
324. Id. at D/507.
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an additional $14,173 plus interest in lost wages, were assessed jointly and
severally against the corporation and its sole director and owner.325
The Alberta Individual's Rights Protection Act does not specifically
provide compensation for hurt feelings;32 6 however, this has not stopped
the Alberta Board of Inquiry from awarding such damages. In Contenti
v. Gold Seats, Inc. ,327 a woman alleged that she had been verbally sexually
harassed at work and sexually assaulted off-the-workplace by her
supervisor.3 28 The plaintiff received $1000 in general damages for the
employer's failure to take timely corrective action, $440 for loss of wages
due to constructive discharge, and $1000 to defray the costs of appearing
before the provincial Human Rights Commission.329
Even the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) did not escape
liability when it was sued for sexual harassment by a former Albertan
female mountie. Alice Clark alleged that her male coworkers had made
sexist comments, that she had been grabbed and kissed by one coworker,
and that someone had "put a pair of plastic breasts on her desk."'330 In
1986, after three years of harassment,331 Clark filed an internal complaint
and was informed by letter that although her "complaints were
'unsubstantiated' . . . certain 'improprieties' by some members had been
noted and appropriate action taken."33 2 Clark quit and filed suit against
the RCMP in 1988 and, in April 1994, was awarded $93,000 plus attorney
fees for lost wages and pain and suffering. The federal judge concluded
that her harassment was extreme, deliberate, and designed to inflict
nervous shock.334
325. Id. at D/510.
326. Individual's Rights Protection Act, 3 R.S.A., ch. 1-2, § 31(1)(b)(iv) (1980)
(Can.). See Contenti v. Gold Seats Inc., 11992] 20 C.H.R.R. D/74, D/84 (Alta. Bd.
Inq.).
327. [1992] 20 C.H.R.R. D174 (Alta. Bd. Inq.).
328. Id. at D178. The supervisor, who lured the plaintiff to his apartment on "false
business pretences" and assaulted her, was convicted of sexual assault before the plaintiff's
sexual harassment claims were decided by the Board. Id.
329. Id. at D/78.
330. Ex-Mountie Gets $93,000 for Sexual Harassment, TORONTO STAR, April 28,
1994, at A2.
331. Id. Clark was first subject to harassing comments in 1993. Id.
332. Adrienne Tanner, Sexual Harassment Case to be Reviewed: Examination Ordered
Into RCMP's Handling of Seven-Year-Old Complaint Made by Former Alberta Officer,
VANC. SUN, April 29, 1994, at A8.
333. Id.
334. Id. Complainant plans to spend the $93,000 on paying off her home and in
1996]
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IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM
In Britain, sexual harassment is viewed, as are many discrimination
issues, as primarily a workplace problem. 335  This view of sexual
harassment, although true and at first sight uncontroversial, has until
recently provided an effective cap on the amount of damages that may be
awarded in sexual harassment cases. In the landmark case of Strathclyde
Regional Council v. Porcelli,336 sexual harassment claims were held to be
matters of sexual discrimination under the applicable English law and
required to be primarily pursued in the industrial tribunal system.337
The industrial tribunals were established as specialized industrial
relations tribunals and are not, in the strict sense, courts of law.33 They
are staffed by three-member panels: a legally qualified chairman, usually
a barrister or solicitor with at least seven years practicing experience, and
two wing members.339 The wing members are appointed by the two sides
of industry, the local organizations of the Trade Union Congress and the
Confederation of British Industry, from among persons with experience in
industrial life.34° Because these three members are co-equal in status and
decisions are reached by a majority, the two wing members may out vote
the chairman on a point of law. Industrial tribunals, however, are not
courts of record and their decisions have no precedential value.34" '
bankrolling "a shopping spree." Id. Within Alberta, the RCMP plans to "dig up" the
seven-year-old complaint and find out "what, if any, actions were taken." Id.
Delays, such as those experienced by Ms. Clark, are not uncommon. In 1987, a
secretary complained before the Ottawa Human Rights Commission that she was
terminated for reporting a professor's affairs with students. In 1994, the board chair
recused herself because of delays, possible bias, and "improper disclosure of evidence."
Understandably the complainant stated, "I don't feel anything other than frustrated. It's
another delay after eight years of this." Inquiry Chairman Resigns After Complaints About
How She Handled Sex Bias Case, GAZEtTE (Montreal), Feb. 20, 1994, at A6.
335. See, e.g., European Commission Report, The Protection of the Dignity of Women
and Men at Work, 1992 O.J. (L 49/2).
336. [1986] 15 I.R.L.R. 134 (Ct. Spec. Sess.) (Eng.).
337. See id. This requirement is imposed by Section 63 of the Sex Discrimination Act
of 1975. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 7, § 63 (Eng.).
338. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, ch. 44, § 128, sched. 9
(Eng.).
339. Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993, S.I.
199312687, amended by S.I. 1994/536 (Eng.). See also 3.A. FARmER, TRImuNALS ANM
GOVERNMENT 56 (1974).
340. See FARMER, supra note 339.
341. See generally id.
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Appeals on points of law may be made from industrial tribunals to the
Employment Appeal Tribunal, which is a superior court of record,
presided over by a High Court Judge and two wing members. 42 While
decisions of the Appeal Tribunal normally consist of only one judgment,
it is theoretically possible for the two wing members, who are also
appointed by industrial organizations, to overrule the judge. An appeal
from the Employment Appeal Tribunal may be made on a point of law to
the Court of Appeals and similarly to the House of Lords-Britain's highest
court. 
343
Typically, damage awards have been between £600 and £5000, with
an average figure in 1990 of £2305.344 Damages for sex discrimination
have always stood at a very low level: £1764 was the median award in
1990-91; £1725 in 1991-92; and £1146 in 1992-93. 34 These amounts are
slightly less than the amounts awarded in race discrimination cases: £1749
in 1990-91; £1374 in 1991-92; and £3333 in 1992-93.346
In comparison to the U.S., the low level of these awards is readily
apparent in the case of Longmore v. Kei Kam Lee.347 The applicant (also
known in the U.S. as a complainant or plaintiff) suffered a severe illness
requiring psychiatric treatment due to the defendant's insistent demands for
sexual favors.348 She was, however, only awarded £3000 for injury to her
feelings. 349
342. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, ch. 44, § 135, sched. 11 (Eng.)
(as amended); Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1980, S.I. 1980/2035 (as amended)
(Eng.).
343. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, ch. 44, § 136, sched. 11 (as
amended) (Eng.).
344. See Alice Leonard, Remedies for Sexual Harassment, 141 NEw L.J. 1514 (1991).
Leonard reports one award of the order of £15,000. Id. This would seem to include
some element of unpaid wages.
345. See id.
346. Id.
347. 1989 C.O.I.T. 21745/88/LN/C (London Indus. Trib.). All cases decided by the
industrial tribunals are not published in an official reporter series. To obtain an official
copy contact the Central Office of Industrial Tribunals in Britain.
348. Id. at 6-11.
349. Id. at 16. The term "aggravated damages" is something of a misnomer. It refers
to the situation where the level of damages appears rather higher than the amount usually
awarded. The level of damages awarded in such exceptional cases reflects the finding that
the harassment was particularly severe.
1996]
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Another example of the low level of damages is the recent case of
Gates v. Security Express Guards.350 A twenty year-old man alleged that
two male coworkers simulated anal intercourse and masturbation, and then
attempted to simulate anal intercourse with him. 351 Mr. Gates resigned in
protest, recovered £3000 for the loss of his job, and was awarded £1500
for damage to his employment prospects and injury to his feelings. 352 The
£3000 award was quite meager, as it represented just a fraction of Mr.
Gates's annual salary. 35 3 In addition, the court ignored Mr. Gates's future
employment record. He worked for another security guard company from
November 7 until December 12, 1992, when he was dismissed on the
basis of an adverse reference from his former employer.354 He then
remained unemployed at least until the decision of the Industrial Tribunal
on June 21, 1993. 355
In Britain, an action for sexual harassment is often brought with an
action for unfair dismissal.356 In Darby v. Bracebridge Engineering,357 for
example, the applicant was awarded £2900 for unfair dismissal and only
£150 for sexual harassment after she was subjected to a serious, indecent
assault by a senior manager who roughly grabbed her genitals. 35 Even
though the Industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal
confirmed that a single act of this nature may constitute sexual
harassment,359 the award for sexual harassment seems remarkably low.
In some sexual harassment cases, the tribunals decided that the harm
suffered by the applicant was very slight because of his or her attitude
towards sexual matters. 360 This amounts to a somewhat unedifying attempt
350. 1993 C.O.I.T. 45142/92 (Cardiff Indus. Trib.).
351. Id. at 2.




356. Under section 55 2(c) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978,
when an employee resigns because of intolerable action by an employer, it will be treated
as a constructive dismissal. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, ch. 44,
§ 55, sched. 3 (Eng.).
357. 1990 I.R.L.R. 3 (Empl. App. Trib.) (Eng.).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See Snowball v. Gardner Merchant Ltd., 1987 I.C.R. 719, 723 (Empl. App.
Trib.) (Eng.). In Wileman v. Minilec Eng'g Ltd., 1988 I.R.L.R. 144 (Empl. App. Trib.)
(Eng.), the defense sought to adduce evidence that the applicant had posed in a state of
undress for a photograph published in a tabloid newspaper. Id. at 146.
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by the tribunals to set themselves up as custodians bonos mores. This may
stem from the composition of the industrial tribunal panels, which are
often staffed by men with traditional attitudes. In both Snowball v.
Gardner Merchant Ltd.36' and Wileman v. Minilec Engineering Ltd. ,362
evidence regarding the sexual proclivities and attitudes of the applicants
was adduced by he defense. In Wileman, evidence that the applicant wore
provocative clothing to work, for example, "paper toweling around the
upper part of her body," 363 was admitted to reflect on her character to
determine the level of emotional injury when calculating her award. 3 4
The Tribunal held that the applicant had suffered little detriment because
of her forthright and candid attitude toward sex and awarded her nominal
damages of £50.36 Likewise, the Tribunal in Snowball admitted evidence
of the applicant's relaxed attitude toward sexual matters in the workplace
holding such to be an acceptable gauge in determining the degree of her
injury. 366
Furthermore, exemplary (or punitive) damages may not be awarded
in sexual harassment cases.367 Such damages may only be awarded for
torts recognized under English law prior to 1964, and the statutory tort of
sex discrimination was not created until the passage of the Sex
Discrimination Act in 1975.368 Exemplary damages are awarded in the
U.K. to emphasize the egregious nature of the tort and are designed to
have a punitive effect; 369 the Law Commission has recently recommended
that this law be reformed to allow awards of exemplary damages in sexual
harassment and other cases.37°
Although damage awards in sexual harassment cases have historically
been very low, a combination of two factors make it more likely that
higher levels of damages will be awarded in the future. First, the
Recommendation of the European Commission37 is that conduct of a
361. Snowball, 1987 I.C.R. at 723.
362. Wileman, 1988 I.R.L.R. at 146.
363. Id. at 148.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 148-49.
366. See Snowball, 1987 I.C.R. at 724-25.
367. See U.K. LAW COMM'N, AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND REST1TUTIONARY
DAMAGES, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 132, HMSO 129-30 (1993).
368. Id.
369. Id. at 13.
370. Id. at 132.
371. The Recommendation of the Commission was cited in Wadman v. Carpenter
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sexual nature, or other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of
women and men at work, is unacceptable and may, in certain
circumstances, be contrary to the principle of equal treatment within the
meaning of Articles 3, 4, and 5 of Directive 76/207/EEC. 372 However,
the legal status of the Recommendations of the Commission is at best
unclear, and they may not grant enforceable rights under European
Community law.373 The most authoritative view of the status of the
Recommendations comes from the European Court of Justice's decision in
Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionelles.37 While the Grimaldi
court held that the Recommendations cannot create rights on which
individuals may rely before a national court, the Recommendations are not
legally impotent.3 75 The court decided that domestic courts are bound to
consider the Recommendations when they clarify the interpretation of
national provisions adopted to implement them or when they are designed
to supplement binding European Community measures.376 This means that
the protected right is based in domestic law and the Community
Recommendation is to be regarded simply as an interpretive tool.
Arguably, the Recommendation regarding sexual harassment creates
a right under European Community law upon which plaintiffs may rely.377
If a court were to find that a right guaranteed by European Community
law is infringed when a person is sexually harassed, the rules recently
expounded by the Court of Justice of the European Community in
Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Health Authority
(No. 2)378 would be brought into effect. In Marshall (No. 2), the court
held that national laws, such as the relevant provisions of the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975, which restrict remedies for the infringement
of rights guaranteed under the Treaty of Rome, are unlawful as a matter
Farrer Partnership, 1993 I.R.L.R. 374, 377 (Empl. App. Trib.) (Eng.).
372. Id.
373. See Janet Dine & Bob Watt, Sexual Harassment: Hardening the Soft Law, 19
Eup. L. REv. 104, 109 (1994).
374. 1989 E.C.R. 4407 (Belg.).
375. Id. at 4421; see Dine & Watt, supra note 373, at 109.
376. Grimaldi, 1989 E.C.R. at 4421; see Dine & Watt, supra note 373, at 109.
377. One of the present authors has argued that the European Community courts ought,
as a matter of urgency, to clarify the legal status of the Recommendations. Such a
discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this present article. See Dine & Watt, supra
note 373, at 109.
378. 1994 Q.B. 126 (Eur. Ct. Just.) (Eng.).
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of European Community law.379 The court further held that the remedy
granted must compensate the plaintiff for the entire loss suffered.380
Marshall (No. 2) concerned inequalities in retirement age as enforced by
a Health Authority (which is viewed as an institution controlled by the
state).38' In the first Marshall case, the court found that such inequitable
enforcement was a clear infringement of European Community law.382
While the Marshall rules only apply to employees of a state institution
and to rights guaranteed under European Community law, the British
Government has taken a very wide view of the Marshall (No. 2) judgment.
Ann Widdecombe, on behalf of the Secretary of State for Employment,
stated that the Government would use its powers under section 2(2) of the
European Communities Act of 1972 to amend the Sex Discrimination Act
of 1975 to remove the statutory damages cap.38 3 This statement evidences
an intent to meet and perhaps move beyond the requirement imposed by
the European Court of Justice;3 4 indeed, the Government has now
eliminated the cap under laws other than the Sex Discrimination Act.
Primary legislation has now amended the Race Relations Act of 1976 and
the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Acts of 1976 and 1989 to remove
similar restrictions on remedies in racial and, in the case of the Northern
Ireland Acts, religious discrimination cases.38 5 Moreover, as promised by
Ms. Widdecombe, a statutory instrument amending the Sex Discrimination
Act of 1975 was published on November 11 and came into effect on
November 22, 1993.386 Section 2 of the Regulations simply abolishes the
limit on damages included in the 1975 Act.387
Since the judgment in Marshall (No. 2), there have been a number of
decisions by industrial tribunals in which applicants received awards above
the previous statutory limit. 38 Although these awards were made in
379. Id. at 161.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See id. at 153.
383. 231 PARL.. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992-93).
384. See Grimaldi, 1989 E.C.R. 4407.
385. The Government moved so slowly in this matter that they were, rather
embarrassingly, beaten to the post by a private member's bill, see Race Relations
(Remedies) Act 1994, ch. 10 (Eng.), introduced by an Opposition (Labor) backbencher.
386. The Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations, S.I. 1993, No.
2789 (Eng.).
387. Id.; see also Race Limits to be Removed by Autumn, Equal Opportunities Rev.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 2.
388. See Record Pay-out Follows Marshall, Equal Opportunities Rev., Nov.-Dec.
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pregnancy discrimination cases, the damages in such cases are analyzed
under the same sex discrimination legislation.3" 9 In October 1993, the
London (South) Tribunal awarded £33,000 to a former servicewoman who
had been dismissed from the Royal Air Force ("R.A.F.") after she became
pregnant. 3'0 Because the R.A.F. is a state institution and the right
protected is one clearly recognized under European Community law,391 this
case fell squarely within the rules set out in the Marshall cases. The
application of the Marshall rules in this case clearly enhanced the damages
awarded to the applicant, who had turned down a £3500 offer made by the
R.A.F. for full and final settlement of her claim.
392
There are a number of other pregnancy-related dismissal cases
concerning servicewomen in which substantial damages have been
awarded. In Howell v. Ministry of Defence,393 for example, an Army
captain was awarded slightly more than £24,000. 39  In Cannock v.
Ministry of Defence,39 5 a senior engineering officer in the R.A.F. was
awarded a record sum of £172,939 with interest for the loss of career
prospects and pension rights, as a resettlement grant, and for injury to
feelings.396 Sixteen other cases heard to date in the industrial tribunals
have led to awards averaging £52,738, 39' and there is speculation that the
Ministry of Defence will eventually pay damages totalling £200 million.398
The Employment Appeal Tribunal has now heard a consolidated
appeal involving the amount of the award granted in Cannock. The
Tribunal held this amount to be wrong in principle because it was quite
out of proportion to the harm suffered by the applicant as a result of her
dismissal. 399 The Tribunal reasoned that pregnancy would only keep the
1993, at 2.
389. See, e.g., id.
390. See id.
391. See Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941, 1991 I.R.L.R. 27 (Eur. Ct. Just.)
(Eng.) (a case deriving from the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207).
392. See Record Pay-out Follows Marshall, supra note 388.
393. 1993 C.O.I.T. 2947/93 (London Indus. Trib.).
394. Id.
395. 1993 C.O.I.T. 6551/92 (London Indus. Trib.), aff'd but criticized, Ministry of
Defence v. Cannock, [1995] 2 All E.R. 449.
396. Id.
397. £9.3M Sex Bias Pay-out for MoD-and Rising, Equal Opportunities Rev., Mar.-
Apr. 1994, at 2.
398. Id.
399. See Ministry of Defence v. Cannock, [19951 2 All E.R. 449, 1994 I.C.R. 918,
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women out of the labor market for a relatively short time and, therefore,
any long term financial loss suffered could not be directly attributable'
to their dismissals.
Notwithstanding the Employment Appeal Tribunal's decision, there
is clear evidence that this new statutory regime is having a significant
effect upon damages awarded in sexual harassment cases. Two press
reports, in particular, have documented this effect. The first involves a
case of racial and sexual harassment within the (London) Metropolitan
Police.4"' P.C. Sarah Locker alleged that she was given a sham request
for special training made out in her name that contained derogatory
references to her sex and race.402 Furthermore, she alleged that she was
presented with pornographic magazines and subjected to relatively petty
physical assaults, none of which were offenses subject to disciplinary
action under the police disciplinary procedures.' 3 It was reported that the
police behaved in an oppressive fashion in investigating Locker's
complaint.' In an out-of-court settlement, Locker agreed to accept
£32,500, retraining for a more attractive section of the police service, an
apology from one of the male officers responsible for her mistreatment,
and an apology from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner.
40 5
In a very recent case, a woman was awarded a total of £34,160 in
damages by the London (South) Industrial Tribunal. 4" She complained to
the police that her employer had "fondled" her and pushed her against a
wall while he masturbated and then ejaculated over her. '  The employer
was charged with criminal assault, but while on bail, he dismissed the
woman from her job and refused to give her the compensation she was
1994 I.R.L.R. 509 (Empl. App. Trib.) (Eng.).
400. The rule established in Marshall (No.2) required that the compensation be
awarded for any loss directly attributable to the act of discrimination. Marshall (No. 2),
1994 Q.B. at 151.
401. See She Khar Bhatia, Sex-Taunt WPC Wins Apology from the Met Chief, EVENING




405. See Richard Ford, WPC Wins Apology and Promotion, THE TIMES (London),
Dec. 8, 1993.
406. Tim Butcher, Sex-Pest Case Woman Wins Record Claim, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Aug. 9, 1994, at 8.
407. Id.
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owed. 4°a The woman proved to the Tribunal that, apart from suffering the
indignity of these assaults, she had subsequently suffered from anxiety,
insomnia, a stress-related stomach ulcer, and psychological disorders
including self-mutilation. 4 9 Her employer was jailed for eighteen months
after being convicted of assault and ordered to pay the woman £11,000 in
damages for the harassment.410 The balance of the damage award was
comprised of £12,960 for back pay and lost wages, £5200 for future loss
of earnings, and £5000 for the "added insult" of being dismissed. 41t The
award based on the insult of dismissal, however, is a novel one and is
probably grounds for appeal.412
There seems to have been very few attempts to allege common law
torts, such as assault, in sexual harassment cases. In such instances,
assault actions would lie against harassers and their employers, who may
be vicariously liable for actions of their employees. Few details have
emerged in such cases because of out-of-court settlements. In one such
case, a magazine's Director of Advertising and Marketing was subjected
to a campaign of sexually-charged abuse and debasement by a superior.
413
Few details of the action are available except that the applicant sued in tort
and for breach of contract and that an out-of-court settlement of
approximately £25,000 was agreed to by the parties.41 4 In another poorly
reported case, a woman known as "Lynne," who was one of the first three
female firefighters in London, was subjected to a number of assaults.4"5
Firemen poured a bucket of urine over her and masturbated openly in her





412. See, e.g., Addis v. Gramophone Ltd., 1909 App. Cas. 488, 491 (reversing Eng.
Ct. of App.) (developing a doctrine which provides that damages may not be made for
injury to feelings in dismissal cases).
413. Muerhing v. E.M.A.P. PLC, 1988 C.O.I.T. 10824/88/LS (London South Indus.
Trib.).
414. Ginny Dougary, At Work in a Company of Wolves; Few Women Dare to
Complain of Sexual Harassment. Ginny Dougary Asks Why?, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Aug. 5, 1990, at 23.
415. Liz CURTiS, MAKiNG ADvANCES, WmAT rou CAN Do ABouT SExUAL
HARASSMENT AT WORK 4142 (1993).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 42.
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out-of-court settlement, she received £25,000 in compensation from her
employer and a total of £2100 by the offending firemen.4 i8
Employers often informally settle discrimination claims arising
through the industrial tribunal system because the Advisory Conciliation
and Arbitration Service ("A.C.A.S. "), an independent government agency,
is under a statutory duty to ascertain whether employers and their ex-
employees may resolve their differences amicably. 4 19 Arbitration often
results in a cash offer being made to the former employee. Prior to the
introduction of the 1993 Regulations, settlements of between £5000 and
£10,000 would be regarded as generous by those working in the field.
The counsel for the unnamed female applicant in the case involving
criminal assault is reported to have stated that the award of £11,000 for
sexual harassment is by far the largest she had seen. 420
However, the damages awarded in sexual harassment cases have to be
compared to those awarded in cases brought under a cause of action other
than statutory sexual harassment. For example, in Houston v. Smith, 421 a
doctor was accused by another doctor, who worked in the same building,
of sexually harassing her and members of her staff.422 The accuser
complained loudly before a waiting room full of patients that her male
colleague had groped her and members of her staff.423 The male doctor
sued his accuser for defamation and was awarded £150,000 in damages by
a jury.424 Although this award was found to be excessive and reduced to
£50,000 on appeal,425 the damages awarded remain much higher than that
given even in the extreme case of sexual assault discussed above. It is
clearly a matter of some regret that a professional man's reputation should
be more highly valued than a woman's safety and basic dignity.
418. Id.
419. See Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, § 247(1),
A.C.A.S., 16 July 1992 (entered in force 16 Oct. 1992) (Eng.).
420. See Butcher, supra note 406.




424. Id. Defamation actions are unique in Britain as being the only civil actions tried
by juries as to fact and assessment of damages.
425. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
A number of conclusions may be drawn from this survey. The
authors note that there are great differences between the British and North
American cases. First, it appears from the court reports that sexual
harassment is much more severe in North America. It may be that British
men are much more reserved than their American counterparts, although
even a cursory reading of British cases of rape and indecent assault would
lead to the opposite conclusion.
The second possible explanation is that British courts and tribunals are
much less ready to have the often sordid and disturbing details of
harassment recorded in their transcripts and that sexual harassment cases
in Britain are less easy to trace.42 There is some evidence that this is the
case. In the Snowball case discussed in this article, the court made it plain
that it considered some of the facts unsuitable for recital.427 The British
industrial tribunals have used statutory provisions that allow them to hear
cases involving sexual misconduct behind a veil of anonymity.42 This
makes it difficult to trace sexual harassment cases through the largely
unreported industrial tribunal system.
A likely explanation for this refusal of the British courts to recite the
details of the harassment is that, in the absence of exemplary damages, it
is legally irrelevant. Because the courts and tribunals are dealing mainly
with the loss of earnings occasioned by a statutory tort and not with
actions for trespass to the person, the level of the interference with the
victim is unimportant. In contrast, in the U.S., where the facts of the
harassment are of the essence and affect the computation of damages, the
recitation of the facts is central to the case.
The third possible explanation is that British women are less likely to
record, report, or litigate sexual harassment. This seems to be a much
more likely explanation given that surveys have shown that sexual
harassment at work is a serious and non-isolated problem throughout the
European Union. 29
426. See, for example, Marshall v. Nelson Elect., 766 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Okla. 1991)
providing vivid details concerning a female worker's allegations of sexual harassment by
her male coworker. Moreover, British cases within the industrial tribunals are unreported;
thereby making it very difficult to accurately determine the current state of litigated sexual
harassment claims.
427. See Snowball, 19W7 I.C.R. at 123.
428. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, ch. 44, § 128, sched. 9
(Eng.).
429. See, e.g., European Commission Report, supra note 335.
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A further difference that may be identified between the British and the
U.S. approaches to sexual harassment is a greater willingness in Britain
to rely solely on the employer or other relevant authority, such as
university management or a professional body, to exercise its disciplinary
powers over an employee harasser. The victims of harassment view this,
in the overwhelming majority of cases, as resolving the matter.43° The
British practice is to some extent supported by decisions of the courts and
tribunals, such as Balgobin v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets,43'
which makes it plain that an employer may avoid vicarious liability for the
actions of harassers by implementing reasonably practicable steps to
prevent the employee from harassing others.432 Where the employer has
taken these steps and is thus not liable for damages, the harassed employee
finds himself (or herself) in the position of having to proceed in tort
against a possibly impecunious harasser.
Even where the harasser is financially well-off, it seems from the
dearth of cases that sexual harassment victims in Britain are unlikely to
proceed against their harassers. In a recent case involving a leading
barrister, Mr. Nigel Hamilton, Q.C., a member of the ruling General Bar
Council and an Assistant Recorder, was held by the Council of the Inns
of Court to have made sexually offensive remarks to a female client.433
He is reported to have made sexual innuendos to her about her diary and
her sex life, and referred to her boyfriend in a racist fashion.
43 4
Furthermore, he was found to have smacked her posterior and that of a
solicitor's female clerk, and to have asked indecent questions about both
women's sexual experiences. 435 These events took place in September and
October 1992.436 The matter apparently was heard by the Disciplinary
Tribunal in January 1995 and the Tribunal deprived Mr. Hamilton of the
430. See infra note 431.
431. 1987 I.R.L.R. 401 (Empl. App. Trib.) (Eng.). For a further discussion of
vicarious liability, see Tower Book Co. Ltd. v. Jones, 1995 I.R.L.R. 529 (Empl. App.
Trib.) (Eng.); Waters v. Met. Police Comm'n, 1995 I.R.L.R. 531 (Empl. App. Trib.)
(Eng.).
432. Balgobin, 1987 I.R.L.R. at 402.
433. Ian MacKinnon, Three Month Ban for QC Who Sexually Harassed Women, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 3, 1995, at 7. The letters Q.C. denote that Mr. Hamilton
is a Queen's Counsel, this indicates seniority and success in the profession. An assistant
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right to practice at the Bar for three months.437 This clearly amounts to
a very substantial financial penalty. The Lord Chancellor's Department,
the body that appoints judges, is reported to be considering withdrawing
Mr. Hamilton's authorization to sit as a part-time judge.438 However, in
marked contrast to the Baker & McKenzie case,439 there is no indication
that the victims have proceeded, or have any intention of proceeding,
against Mr. Hamilton for damages. 44
The authors were not surprised to observe that the levels of
compensation awarded by the Canadian and British courts are much lower
than some of the headline-grabbing U.S. decisions. The British author of
this article would advance the comment that he could not imagine a British
court ever awarding daxnages of the level awarded in the U.S. Baker &
McKenzie case." While it is theoretically possible for very high levels
of awards to be made following the decision of the European Court of
Justice in Marshall (No. 2), it is most unlikely that such awards will be
acceptable to judges or to the public. The level of the award in the
Cannock pregnancy-related dismissal case was the subject of considerable
public outcry and drew unfavorable comparison with the levels of damages
awarded in fairly severe personal injury claims made in tort and with those
awarded by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. A woman
subjected to sexual harassment which fell well short of a serious sexual
assault would, it seems, be viewed by the public as having been grossly
overcompensated if she were to receive damages approaching £10,000.
While the British author disagrees most emphatically with these
sentiments, the attitudes of the public toward sexual harassment litigation
explains, at least in part, the differences between the U.S. and Britain. It
is necessary to record them because they go some way towards explaining
the differences between the U.S. and Britain.
The comparatively low level of British awards may explain the
apparent reluctance of British women to litigate sexual harassment cases;
however, it is possible that other cultural influences are at work. It will
be instructive to observe whether there is a rapid increase in litigation
following Marshall (No. 2) and the passage of the statutory instrument"2
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Baker & McKenzie, No. 943043 (Ca. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1994).
440. Ma=Kiwmon, supra note 433.
441. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.




raising the level of compensation awarded to victims of sexual harassment.
A higher level of potential damage awards is likely to encourage women
to undertake the often embarrassing and unpleasant litigation.
Male-on-male harassment or female-on-male harassment is rarely
reported in Britain, although it is clear that it occurs. All forms of
harassment are undoubtedly profoundly disturbing to the victim, but it may
be that these types of harassment are particularly embarrassing. Where a
woman is harassed, it is likely that she will receive a great deal of support
and sympathy from female coworkers; however, where a man is harassed,
it is possible that he will be stigmatized by other men. The British public
displays a more general antipathy toward gay men than seems to be the
case in the U.S., and it may be that a man who is harassed by another
man would be viewed as effeminate. Furthermore, a man who is harassed
by a woman is likely to be seen, in the popular view, as worthy of envy
rather than sympathy. For him to complain might well be seen as an
admission of disliking the sexual attentions of women. So long as levels
of compensation in Britain remain relatively low, many men may be
unwilling to expose themselves to such stereotypical public opinions.
The Canadian system of specific human rights statutes, 4 3 which is
also seen at state level in the U.S., avoids the difficulties inherent in the
British system because the violation of a right labeled a "human right"
emphasizes the egregious nature of harassing conduct. While the level of
compensation seems relatively modest, the Canadian response seems to
have been to increase the seriousness of the tort, allowing the victim to
attain psychological vindication by being able to show that the harasser has
infringed her or his human rights. This may explain why sexual
harassment litigation seems more frequent in Canada than in Britain, even
though the damages awarded in such litigation are broadly comparable.
It is clear in all three jurisdictions that an employer must have a
written policy on sexual harassment. Furthermore, the employer must
take prompt remedial action to investigate and, if necessary, rectify a
situation where sexual harassment has developed. 4' If an employer does
443. See supra note 244.
444. See Foster v. Township of Hillside, 780 F. Supp. 1026, 1039 (D. N.J. 1992),
aff'd, 977 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992). "Courts that have decided the issue, have placed
great weight on whether the harassment ended after remedial steps were taken." Id. Also
significant is the type and thoroughness of the investigation and the appointment of an
independent arbitrator. The court in Foster granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment notwithstanding the applicant's allegation that a non-supervisory police sergeant
masturbated in front of her and wore a brassiere under his shirt. Id. at 1032. "Then,
when employees did the same thing two years later, the company fired him. But the judge
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this, all three jurisdictions will permit mitigation, if not an elimination, of
the damages for sexual harassment.
said the company was wrong because it did not fire him the first time." Borden, supra
note 224.
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